


Anglican Theological Review



EDITED BY

SHERMAN E. JOHNSON AND ALDEN D. KELLEY

FOUNDED BY SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

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THEOLOGY (PASTORAL)

The day may not be far off when Pastoral Theology can be welcomed back into the household of theological disciplines. The Queen of the Sciences has been none too friendly to this member of the household, and indeed Pastoral Theology itself has often allowed the adjective in its name to conceal the noun while it has been quite at ease in fields alien to theology. A hardening has set in on both sides, but there are encouraging signs of *rapprochement*. Gone is the day when Pastoral Theology in the seminary curriculum was usually dealt with by elderly clergymen who regaled their students with pastoral anecdotes from a culture which even then was rapidly disappearing; but we have not yet seen the end of the youthful reaction to that regime, a reaction in which the subject has been largely taken over by the experts in education and the social sciences. Nor are we likely to see the end of this reaction until theologians take the social sciences still more seriously than they do now. It is not enough that theologians should make critical studies of the *assumptions* of the social sciences (a task which they now pursue with some enthusiasm); it is important also that they should become more familiar with the research *methods and findings* of these sciences. One branch of theology might then become more deeply pastoral without ceasing to be truly theology.

In the meanwhile reputable and scientific disciplines, such as psychotherapy and the study of group dynamics, tend, in religiously parched minds, to assume the status of religions. This is as bewildering to the true scientist, who has no intention of starting a new re-

ligion, as it is a source of dismay to the old fashioned pastor who wonders what the "new-fangled religion of group dynamics" is all about. Earlier, and in much the same sort of way, communism came to serve a religious function in groups where justice had not been recognized as the will of God. We may learn from the comparison.

As things stand, Pastoral Theology has tended to become either a restricted Pastoralia (a sort of marginalia to the curriculum), or else it has disintegrated into multifarious specialisms, and these have each developed jargons and journals of their own, and have found their roots increasingly in the contemporary philosophies of the social sciences rather than in theology. For the most part the theologians have been only too glad to wall them off in these alien fields where they can be prevented from invading the theological curriculum, for it is assumed that these others have ceased to be any sort of theology at all.

The effectiveness of the Church in the world, to the extent to which it relies upon the agency of human beings who are its members, depends upon there being an understood and secure dogmatic foundation on the one hand and on the other a progressive insight into the nature of the world and the men who inhabit it, in groups and as individuals. The freedom of the Church rests upon its self-awareness, the knowledge of its own essence, which necessarily involves the knowledge and love of Christ. Without this knowledge the Church suffers, in relation to the events that go on about it, either from crippling rigidity in dealing with the contemporary situation, or from that multiple-mindedness which sends it tossing about from one political, economic or psychological fashion to the next. In itself it is split and uncertain, in its action inconsistent and half-way. Given the understanding of its own self, but without those up-to-date insights into physical reality suggested by the sciences and by sober realism, the Church fails to present its message as relevant to its own age and may fail even to make its voice heard above other groups which are conversant with the actual world and more adept in its techniques.

The Church is spiritual and eternal, and because our Lord's sacrifice was full and sufficient, the whole of mankind is redeemed before God in the Body of Christ. The Church is also physical and historical, and as such it is not universal. It appears as one fellowship, one entity, among others. To embrace both these truths simultaneously and to act upon their unity seems to be incredibly difficult, and yet the training of priests, and in their turn the nurturing of the flock, must be addressed to this end. It is upon the behaviour of Christians who

have achieved less than this unity of conception that is based the widespread notion of the Church (by Christian and non-Christian alike) as *primarily* sentimental opiate, or a guardian of social morality, or the leaven of respectability. And so social workers, doctors, lawyers, mental health workers speak of religion as *contributing*, or not, to social and personal security and well-being, as, or as no longer, being *useful* for the attainment of their particular notion of the *summum bonum*. Religion in its positive (and generally Christian) manifestations has come in our culture therefore to be regarded as a technique along with others, to be employed until new advances in science and technology make it obsolete. Even those who concede that religion is here to stay regard it as being a *part* of the whole healthy man—provided it is kept in its proper place and not overdone.

The purpose of theological training may be analyzed as twofold: to instruct in those disciplines which contribute to a deeper understanding of the Faith; and to bring to the attention of the students, by whatever method, the basic means by which the Faith may be communicated to the people of his future parish and they themselves brought into the worshipping fellowship. The group of disciplines required for this latter task might have been embraced under the term Pastoral Theology if that term had not fallen apart. After all, are not Religious Education and Pastoral Psychology now considered more important, for they require *real* experts to teach them?

From this basis there is no limit to the vigor and ingenuity and practicality that can be applied to the work of the Church in its parishes. So long as confusion remains as to what are means and what are ends; so long as priests are allowed to be lost along the tangents of statistics, of building programmes, of moralism and sentimentalism, of the psychologies of this and that, can it be wondered at if others look upon Christianity as a means? If the Church is not to be commanded by what is alien in the social sciences she must take command herself and use these sciences with sobriety and discrimination. Subjective piety and a 'glad hand' are no substitute for intelligence and imagination in making the faith relevant. But these qualities of intelligence and imagination must be stimulated and guided. If, in looking about us, we perceive that disciplined imagination is lacking we can assume that training has fallen down, that Pastoral Theology is not accomplishing what it should.

Theological training cannot envisage the structure of all the parishes to which newly ordained priests are likely to be called. It is not neces-

sary that it should. The principles are there, the scholarship and information is close at hand, and the imaginative lecturer aided by well supervised field work can soon stimulate the student into the sort of thinking, the sort of attitude which, it is hoped, will become a habit. This is already being done, and the signs of a new Pastoral Theology are already emerging, rooted in the Classical theological tradition but deeply aware of social change. Examples of this be seen in some of the more recent books and periodical literature.

After drafting this editorial our attention was drawn to the article by Dr. Joachim Scharfenberg in the *Journal of Pastoral Care* (Fall, 1954) entitled *The Babylonian Captivity of Pastoral Theology*. We were not unnaturally startled by the similarity of his theme to our own and pleased that it bears out our own contention, and, while not agreeing with all his analyses and judgements, we have seen no better survey of the contemporary literature of Pastoral Theology as a branch of theology. We believe a new day is dawning for Pastoral Theology, a day in which pastors and theologians may renew a friendship which has been broken for too long and with too much self-satisfaction on both sides.

CHARLES H. FEILDING AND GORDON WATSON

GRACE AND SPIRIT IN THE AUGUSTINIAN TRADITION

(A Re-Discovery of Insights from *The Grace of God* by N. P. Williams, Longmans, Green and Co. 1930.)

By DAVID C. SHIPLEY

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We live in a world which seems eager enough to discuss religion (pro and con) but *theology* is another matter. The charge is often heard, even though in the long run it may be proved false, that theology is the art of intentional deception for the purpose of perverting the pure morality of true religion; or, theology is the device of the irresponsible to make religion an otiose irrelevance. In any case, theology today stands under judgment and must proceed in its task with chastened dedication.

Two theological terms often thought to be archaisms are "grace" and "spirit". Do these words have motivating meaning today? The late Professor Moffatt reminded us that Bishop Berkeley was confronted with just such a situation and in one of his dialogues the free thinking Alciphron speaks his mind. "I can easily understand grace", he admits,

"in the popular sense of beauty or favour but how unintelligible it is on the pages or on the lips of theologians. . . . At the request of a philosophical friend I did cast an eye on the writings he showed me of some divines, and talked with others on the subject, but after all I had read or heard could make nothing of it, *having always found* (whenever I laid aside the word grace and looked into my own mind), a perfect vacuity or privation of ideas. And, as I am apt to think men's minds and faculties are made much alike, I suspect that other men, if they examined what they call grace with the same exactness . . . should agree with me that there is nothing in it but an empty name." (J. Moffat, *Grace in The New Testament*, N. Y.: R. R. Smith 1932, p. 1.)

In so far as such a description is applicable to the contemporary mind with respect to the words "grace" and "spirit" and other value-laden terms, the disciplines of Biblical and Historical Theology once more may return to the service of Systematic Theology in the endeavor critically to re-evaluate vocabulary by noting something of the history

and possible semantic accretions of theological concepts through the centuries.

One such task is the re-examination of the English word "grace" with a view to its theological origins and usage. The *New English Dictionary* defines grace in its theological meaning as "the divine influence which operates in men to regenerate and sanctify, to inspire virtuous impulses, and to impart strength to endure trial and resist temptation." This definition is reflected also in the *Oxford Dictionary* and *Webster's Unabridged*. From the stand-point of liturgical usage, hymnology, homiletics, and the literature of theological exposition and controversy in the English language little fault may be found with this definition. Yet we may well ask the question: Does this definition of the English word "grace" adequately express the meaning of the New Testament Greek word which it translates? Or put in a different context: Does the term *gratia* as used in the Latin Theology of the Church in the West adequately translate the meaning and intention of the New Testament Greek word *xápis*? Either way, the query points to the possibility of a creative discussion which has too long remained latent in one of those monumental little books that great scholars are wont to produce in the wake of more celebrated works.

The late Professor Norman P. Williams, Lady Magaret Professor of Divinity in Oxford University, is well known for his exhaustive study of the *Fall and Original Sin* published in his Bampton Lectures for 1924. A later work of only one hundred seventeen pages with the title *The Grace of God* was published in 1930. This study is too little known outside Anglican circles and even within this fellowship the significance—and the controversial possibilities—of one of Professor Williams' major theses has gone too long without consideration. It is Professor Williams' contention that St. Augustine in his construction of the doctrine of grace ambiguously conflates the Pauline and New Testament concepts of grace and spirit and thus bequeaths to Western Christendom an awkward, if not a seriously perverted, view of God's creative and redemptive relationship with mankind. In short, the Augustinian doctrine of grace has occasioned a loss of an adequate consideration of the work of the Holy Spirit as taught in the New Testament by the simple precedent of attempting to describe the work of the Spirit under the aegis and category of grace. What the New Testament keeps disparate, Augustine conflates into an unwieldy and awkwardly conceived doctrine of the Grace of God. (Of course, Professor Williams is a careful scholar and leads one meticulously through

the maze of historical analysis to the conclusion which he nowhere states quite as forthrightly as is here indicated.)

What impresses the writer is that while Bishop Nygren's similar charge against Augustine (*viz.*, that the determinative New Testament concept of *agape* had been perverted by the process of conflation in Augustine's formulation of the idea of *caritas*) has received wide attention and has occasioned much significant research, the equally important charge of Professor Williams respecting the Augustinian construction of the doctrine of grace has gone un-noticed, for the most part, and has never received the attention in theological discussion which this important conclusion merits. It is the purpose of this paper simply to take notice of Professor Williams' arguments and to find therein suggestions for further study.

Limiting our analysis to the understanding of grace found in the Pauline Epistles, Professor Williams discerns a basic meaning in the word grace, *viz.*, God's favor or kindness toward man. This favor is not thought of as an abstract quality or state of His Being; it is a dimension of God's activity—an activity of a two-fold kind:

(1) . . . "the pre-mundane act whereby He foreknows certain individuals and fore-ordains them to membership in the Church, so that the small body of Christian Jews can be described as a *λέμμα κατ' ἐκλογήν χάριτος* (a remnant constituted by an act of selection based on grace), and (2) the temporal act of 'calling' and justifying (pardoning) the individual as foreknown which though *ex parte hominis* to be considered as contingent upon the individual's 'faith', *ex parte Dei* is so spontaneous an ebullition as *εὐχαιρούμενοι ὡςθεάν τῇ αὐτῶν χάριτι* Romans 9:5 (acquitted freely undeservedly-solely-by an exercise of His Royal grace.)" (p. 11)

The Pauline conception of grace, as interpreted by Professor Williams, has to do primarily with election and justification.

"It has to do with the beginnings of the Christian life, its ideal beginning in time, rather than with its continuance and progress. The concept which the word connotes is regal and judicial in character. It presupposes a way of thinking about God which regards Him as acting upon men and shaping their destinies from without as a king might in a moment of benevolence ennoble a subject who had attracted his attention or pardon a criminal" (p. 11)

If later students find these meanings in St. Paul's description of God's grace, candor must admit that such meanings are present. Does he

not assert again and again that the Divine favor is completely unmerited and gratuitous in quality—that it cannot possibly be earned by works or human effort of any kind. All grace represents the spontaneous self-caused kindness of God; a kindness which no human effort could have evoked were not God a God of Grace.

If we use the philosophical categories of the transcendence and immanence of God, it is possible, without too much wresting, to suggest that St. Paul's construction of the doctrine of grace is always from the view-point of God's transcendence. But St. Paul was equally concerned with the immanent healing work of God. In fact he affirms emphatically that the essence of the Gospel is Divine Power, luring and guiding every one who believes on toward the goal of salvation, the Jew first and also the Greek (Rom. 1:16). But the Pauline name for this supernatural energy or power is πνεῦμα (spirit) not χάρις. "It might seem as though an omnipotent influence which penetrates the citadel of the soul and gradually transforms it from within was as little to be reconciled with human freedom as a sovereign will compelling from without but the Apostle refuses to admit it." Therefore the activity of God in his transcendence is to be described by the term "grace" while the activity of God in His immanence is to be described by the term "spirit".

In St. Paul's thought the viewless tides of "Spirit" or "the Spirit" insensibly flood the springs of human volition in such a way that the Spirit possessed individual does what is good because he spontaneously desires to do what is good, not because of any external sanction or coercion. The qualities of life which are the "fruit of the Spirit" are also the products of one's own self-determining effort. Hence the state of adoption, or sonship, is from one point of view described as being "not under the law but under grace" (Rom. 6:15), from another point of view as serving God in "newness of Spirit, not in oldness of letter" (Rom. 7:6). In these and many other cognate passages in the Pauline *corpus* there is the potentiality of the unification of the ideas of grace and spirit. The ideas of human freedom and of Divine Grace, issuing in sanctifying power, are thus set side by side with no attempt at harmonization. The Apostle is content to rest in the unresolved paradox: "work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, for His good pleasure". (Phil. 2:12)

Since unresolved paradox has had an almost fatal fascination for theologians, St. Paul's somewhat inchoate juxtaposition of the work of

God designated by the term "grace" and the work of God the Holy Spirit is a constant temptation to the system-builder who is usually quite convinced that at long last he has straightened out the theology of St. Paul according to right reason and high ethics. Was St. Augustine one such theologian? Professor Williams is too wise to assert that Augustine was a system-builder but he does make his point:

"If Augustine had frankly equated sanctifying grace with the work of the Holy Spirit his thought would have been at least continuous with that of St. Paul; and, as terminology is merely a matter of convenience, the slight perversion of the Pauline term kindness to denote God's kind and healing power which is the Third Person of His Triune Being would have been pardonable and indeed useful, if care had been taken to guard against the tendency to hypostatize "grace" as an entity other than Spirit". (p. 25)

Professor Williams is very careful to indicate that the hypostatization of grace is only a tendency in Augustine's thought—never a practice. But Augustinianism, or the Augustinian tradition, did many times make this a practice and hence perverted a meaningfully determinative New Testament conception of God's relationship to man. Nevertheless, Augustine must share some of the blame for the loss of a deeply personalistic conception of God's salvific relationship with the human spirit. Somewhere along the line the high experience denoted by the words "His spirit witnesseth with our Spirit" is lost in a conception of grace expressing the coercive dominion of God over the human will. The following passages all taken from Augustine's treatise *On Nature and Grace* will illustrate the point.

"We must not doubt that human wills are incapable of withstanding the Will of God in such a way as to prevent Him from doing what He wishes to do . . . God, however, brought this to pass (the election of Saul to be King of the Israelites) solely through the wills of men themselves, in as much as He assuredly possesses a most almighty power of inclining human hearts whithersoever it may please Him . . . To will or not to will, is in the power of the man who wills or wills not, only in such a way that it does not impede God's Will or vanquish His power . . . God has men's will more in His power than they themselves have their wills in their own power."

These passages represent a dimension of God's relationship to man under the aegis of grace thought of in terms of God's salvific will as exerted interiorly upon the human spirit—and this will is regally

coercive. Professor Williams' point is, simply, that in the New Testament God's salvific will is exerted interiorly upon the human spirit NOT as coercive grace but as the work of the Holy Spirit witnessing to the human spirit with that kind of omnipotence which continuously grants the gift and fact of freedom. "Quench not the Holy Spirit who dwelleth in you". In so far as the Augustinian tradition (let us say as represented by Calvin) following certain constructions in Augustine's *Treatises* refers to God's salvific will operating in human history, especially in relationship to human personality, as a kind of power—or hypostatized grace—apart from God Himself, profound nuances of the New Testament and of the Gospel are lost. God's relationship to man is surely—in the Biblical context—a Person to person relationship. And does not the New Testament teach us that the Presence of the Holy Spirit in the "tabernacle" of a human life is a Person-to-person involvement which led theologians to develop a doctrine of the Person of the Holy Spirit.

This is not the place to attempt a further elaboration of Professor Williams' careful and erudite analysis of the development of the doctrine of grace through the Apostolic Fathers and the intricacies of Augustinian theology. Our purpose here is to call attention to an important critique which might well become as significant for contemporary theology as has Bishop Nygren's comparable study of Augustine's doctrine of *Caritas*. Another purpose is to look at Professor Williams' conclusion, after a survey of the whole history of the doctrine of grace, and to inquire concerning certain implications of that conclusion.

It is Professor Williams' judgment that the time has come to:

"suggest that our comprehension of grace will be enormously deepened and enriched if we take a step on the verge of which Christian theology has perpetually hovered, but which has actually been taken only by a few divines—namely, the frank equation of grace with the work of the Holy Spirit. There are not two healing powers going forth from God, one personal and the other quasi-personal—nor is grace something deposited in the soul by the Holy Spirit . . . If it be frankly recognized that "the Spirit" and "grace" are synonyms we shall be able to recover the Pauline point of view concerning *πνεῦμα* without jettisoning the familiar terminology of grace now consecrated by the usage of well-nigh seventeen centuries." (p. 110)

Thus, if grace is the Holy Spirit at work in human personality, its

operation must be those of a Person with a person. One is required to remark in passing that there is almost as much ground for this view in the writings of Augustine as there is for the quasi-personal hypostatization of grace as developed in the Augustinian tradition. A recent reading of Augustine's moving treatise *On the Spirit and The Letter* recalls this passage:

"We, however, maintain that man is in this way divinely aided toward the accomplishment of righteousness that—over and above the free will with which he was created and the instruction whereby he is taught how he ought to live—he receives the Holy Spirit by whom there is born in his mind a delight in and a love of that Supreme and Incommunicable God, which is God, even now while we walk by faith and not yet by sight . . . But in order that (that which is right) may be loved, the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts, not by free will which arises out of us, but by the Holy Spirit which is given unto us." (Chap. V)

Here surely Augustine is describing a Person-to-person relationship between God and man that does not coercively over-ride the human free-will but lovingly lures life into an unfathomable wholeness. And we need to be reminded that Augustine constructed the concept of personality as it is now used in theological and philosophical discourse for the very purpose of elucidating the means by which man apprehends God's immanent presence in human life as vital, personal, Spirit.

To return to Professor Williams' concluding thesis, namely, that we must find a way of conceiving "grace" as an interior divine impulse or influence which is genuinely that of a Person exerted upon a person which assists without impairing free-will and which is real without being coercive—and that such a way does exist by frankly identifying interior grace with the Holy Spirit. What are some of the implications for theology if such an identification were made?

First, and foremost, it would stimulate the long delayed and now completely necessary task of constructing an intelligible doctrine of the work of the Holy Spirit. Those who have read Canon Fison's provocative study, titled *The Blessing of Holy Spirit* (Longmans, Green and Co, 1950) will recognize the significantly exciting kind of theological inquiry this may be.

Another implication is that such an identification of grace with the work of the Holy Spirit would provide a whole new ground—and perhaps a more fruitful ground—for the study and discussion of the doctrine of the sacraments. The doctrine of the work of God the Holy

Spirit in the sacramental worship of the Church would provide new bases of ecumenical discussion especially with the Churches of the East, and perhaps between the Catholic and Free Church traditions in Western Christendom. (See, for example, J. E. L. Oulton, *Holy Communion and The Holy Spirit*, S.P.C.K., 1954)

Another implication is that such an identification might lead to a more constructive doctrine of man. How is the Holy Spirit related to the human spirit? Here is the paramount issue of Chalcedon respecting Christology transferred to anthropology. If "His Spirit witnesseth with our Spirit", is not every Christian a two-natures-in-one personality type of existence? Do we not have the very real statement of a di-thelitic Christian man in whom two wills are present—the will of God the Holy Spirit, and the free-human will?

Then, the soteriological constructions of Christian theology would be greatly aided if the grace of God were frankly thought of as the work of the Immanent Holy Spirit in human life. The doctrines of general grace would be greatly illuminated—as Professor Nels Ferré sees clearly in his book on *The Christian and Society*. (Harper and Bros. 1949) How does this beneficent Personal Presence affect human life without over-riding free-will? Augustine's distinction of the avenues of God's grace into "the providentially prepared action of exterior causes" and "interior illumination" may be helpful here. A good father often acts as an earthly providence to his children not merely by giving them good suggestions himself, but by placing them in circumstances in which they will be shielded from wrong and exposed to good influences. Special providence, therefore, while subsumed under the aegis of grace in our text-books might well be studied as acts of God's Personal presence in relation to the human personality.

But what, beyond cases of Providence which are always dangerously egocentric, may we think of as other aspects of the saving work of God mediated by the Holy Spirit in human life? Perhaps Schleiermacher has a helpful word here. He writes: "Just this is the work of the Holy Spirit—to bring Christ into memory and glorify Him in us". To remember Christ—with the purpose of disinfecting our recollection of perverting ego-centricity let us remember Him as St. Paul remembers Him in the kenotic apostrophe in Philippians 2:4-10.

"Let each of you look not only to his own interests but also to the interests of others. Have this mind among yourselves, which you have in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form

of God did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant . . ."

The work of the Holy Spirit is the Divine assistance provided for the "emptying of ourselves" into the life of mankind. This is always at the level of person to person relationships. Was Luther right in suggesting that the Holy Spirit leads us into the kind of costly interpersonal relationships which make us analogically "Christs to our nearest neighbors"? If so, this is surely God's work in us and *not* our work. This may be illustrated perhaps by the practices of psychotherapy. Any successful practitioner will testify that his work is not confined to the mere vocal responses between himself and his patient. He has to put his whole will-power into it; virtue in a real sense goes out of him so that at the end of a full day's work he is left emotionally and physically exhausted. The success of psychotherapy depends upon a real bond of unity between therapist and patient. The therapist and his client become for a limited time, and in a very imperfect degree, a spiritual unity, their personalities in some incomprehensible manner confronting and interpenetrating. Is this analogous to the way God the Holy Spirit salvifically heals and keeps on healing our torn and tearing existences? Is this analogous to the way God the Holy Spirit guides in that enervating and costly enterprise of binding to our heart our brother-man? What a realm of grace opens up before us if this, in some measure, be true.

The Christian life empowered by the Holy Spirit is never escapist. It is life driven into the heart of humanity at which heart there is always a Cross—an Easter—and an ever renewed Day of Pentecost.

SOME ANGLICAN MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF LUTHERAN THEOLOGY

By HOWARD R. KUNKLE

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Although there is an increasing awareness of Lutheran theology on the part of Anglican writers, there are times when these writers do less than justice to Lutheran theology. Occasionally one receives the feeling that Roman Catholic canards are thoughtlessly repeated; at other times

the misunderstandings appear innocent enough, caused by a failure to go to the authoritative sources.

For Lutheran theology has authoritative sources unknown to Anglican theology. The voluminous writings of Martin Luther are not normative, regardless of the tremendous influence they exert now and in the past. Ordination to the Lutheran ministry in the United States and Canada requires subscription to the Book of Concord because it is held to be in accord with the teachings of the sacred Scriptures. The Book of Concord (German edition 1580, Latin edition 1584) consists of the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene Creed in its Western form, and the "Athanasian" Creed, plus the Augsburg Confession (1530), the Apology of the Augsburg Confession (1531), the Smalcald Articles with its appendix, "Of the Power and Primacy of the Pope" (1537), the Large Catechism and Small Catechism (1529) and the Formula of Concord (1577). In some parts of the Lutheran Church—including some American church bodies—only the three ecumenical creeds, the Augsburg Confession and the Small Catechism are binding as to doctrine. Lutheran theology is, then, explicit, and ought to be judged not by the writings of Luther or by some aberration of them, but by the confessional standards themselves. The fact that the Anglican Communion is not so dogmatically organized makes it difficult for many of her clergy to understand Lutheran thinking.

Four points are here submitted in which there is Anglican misunderstanding of Lutheran theology. Each is treated in an elementary fashion merely to exhibit the difference between the statements and the interpretations of them, without attempting to justify one position or the other. A fine little compendium, *What the Symbolical Books of the Lutheran Church Have to Say About Worship and the Sacraments*, was published by Concordia Publishing House, St. Louis, in 1952. It was prepared by Arthur Carl Piepkorn, Ph.D., a professor in Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, to whom this writer is indebted for a critical reading of this manuscript.

I. JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH

In a book entitled "Outlines of the History of the Church", by Frederick Joseph Kinsman, sometime Bishop of Delaware, this statement appears: "His [Luther's] doctrine of justification by faith came to take the form of justification of conduct by motive and of justification of motive by personal convenience. Hence in the intellectual and moral theology of Europe, the two men whose influence has most resembled

Luther's have been Ignatius Loyola . . . who fought Protstantism on the principle that the end justifies the means . . . and Machiavelli . . . who was exponent of low-grade principles in politics" (p. 4).

It is true that this author indicts Luther, not necessarily Lutheran theology. But to the average reader the two are the same.

A recent writer, Walter Lowrie, in *What is Christianity* (1953) is hardly more sympathetic. Justification by faith alone is described as unscriptural and the source of the slow progress toward an ecumenical church. This doctrine is called "a hollow hut" and subscription to it "not far from bigotry and fanaticism."

A priest of the Episcopal Church, writing a letter to the editor of *Episcopal Churchnews*, June 13, 1954, refers to "his [Luther's] peculiar doctrine of justification by faith."

Bonnell Spencer, O.H.C., in his history, *Ye Are the Body*, pays tribute to Luther's assertion that man is saved only through the work of Christ, thereby rejecting Pelagianism. But then this influential author goes on to say, "Luther's mistake was his insistence that we are saved by faith only. Luther's dramatic conversion experience was so vivid to him that he tended to consider it in itself the whole process of salvation. He made provision, of course, for the life of sacraments, prayer and good works which follows conversion. But this was always secondary and in no way contributed to salvation. For him the one thing needful was an intense whole-hearted conversion such as he had experienced" (p. 215).

The last sentence might well be disputed. However, the author here confuses salvation with justification as a forensic act. Sanctification must follow, and is included in what the author means by "salvation." The Lutheran symbols use both "justification" and "sanctification" in a somewhat greater variety of senses than subsequent Lutheran orthodox dogmatics has taught Lutherans generally to do. Thus "sanctification" is used both in a "wider" and a "narrower" sense, while "justification" is used not only in the sense of "forgiveness of sins" but also as a synonym of "vivification" and "regeneration." The Formula of Concord states it thus: ". . . but that the righteousness of faith consists alone in the forgiveness of sins out of pure grace, alone for the sake of Christ's merit; which blessings are offered us in the promise of the Gospel, and are received, accepted, applied and appropriated alone by faith.

"Therefore the true order between faith and good works, and also

between justification and renewal or sanctification, must abide and be maintained.

"For good works do not precede faith, neither does sanctification precede justification. But in conversion, first faith is kindled in us by the Holy Ghost from the hearing of the Gospel. It lays hold of God's grace in Christ, whereby the person is justified. Then, when the person is justified, he is renewed and sanctified by the Holy Ghost, from which renewal and sanctification the fruits of good works then follow. This should not be understood as though justification and renewal were sundere from one another, in such manner that a genuine faith sometimes could exist and continue for a long time together with a wicked intention, but hereby only the order of causes and effects, of antecedents and consequents is indicated, as to how one precedes or succeeds the other. For that nevertheless remains true which Luther has correctly said: 'Faith and good works well agree and fit (are inseparably connected); but it is faith alone, without works, which lays hold of the blessings; and yet it is never and at no time alone.'" (Part II, Chapter III, Paragraphs 39-41. Jacobs, *The Book of Concord*, Vol. I, p. 577. All page numbers hereafter refer to this translation.)

The Apology of the Augsburg Confession states, "The particle ALONE offends some, although even Paul says (Rom. 3:28): 'We conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the Law.' Again (Eph. 2:8): 'It is the gift of God; not of works, lest any man should boast.' Again (Rom. 3:24): 'Being justified freely.' If the exclusive ALONE displeases, let them remove from Paul also the exclusive 'freely', 'not of works', 'it is the gift', etc. For these are also exclusives. It is, however, the opinion of merit that we exclude. We do not exclude the Word and sacraments, as the adversaries falsely charge us. For we have said above that faith is conceived from the Word, and we honor the ministry of the Word in the highest degree. Love also and works ought to follow faith. Wherefore they are not excluded so as not to follow, but confidence in the merit of love or of works is excluded in justification." (Chapter II, Article IV, Paragraphs 73 f. Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 96.) In this same confessional statement appeal is made to two of the Church Fathers: St. Augustine in *De Natura et Gratia* and *De spiritu et litera*, and St. Ambrose in *Letters to Irenaeus*. Further scriptural statements are marshalled, such as John 3:5; 8:36; Acts 10:43; 13:38 f.; Rom. 14:23; 11:6; 5:1; 4:14; Gal. 2:16; 3:22; 5:4.

E. J. Bicknell, in his *A Theological Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England*, points out that "The words of our

Article (XI) show that the Church of England on this point takes sides with Luther against the Council of Trent" (p. 257). He speaks, however, of "Lutheran exaggeration" in comparing Article XI with Article IV (Of Justification) of the Augsburg Confession. It is hard, however, to see much difference in ideas between the two articles. Both Bicknell and C. B. Moss (*The Christian Faith*, pp. 183 f.) criticise the theory of "imputed righteousness," the latter identifying it with the theory of penal substitution held jointly by Luther, Calvin, Thomas Aquinas and Anselm. It is true that the Formula of Concord indeed uses this language: "We believe, teach and confess that faith alone is the means and instrument whereby we lay hold of Christ, and thus in Christ of that righteousness which avails before God, for the sake of which *this faith* is imputed to us for righteousness (Rom. 4:5)." (Italics our own.) (Part I, Chapter III, Paragraph 5, *op. cit.*, p. 501.) Moss elaborates his criticism by saying that it is not the righteousness of Christ which is imputed to us, but "what is imputed or reckoned to us for righteousness according to Romans 4, is not Christ's righteousness, but our own faith." But this is what the Formula of Concord states as quoted above. However, the formula of Concord does state regarding justification, "... in and to which only the following belong and are necessary: the grace of God, the merit of Christ, and faith which receives this in the promise of the Gospel, whereby the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us, whence we receive and have forgiveness of sins, reconciliation with God, sonship and heirship of eternal life." (Solid Declaration, Chapter III, Paragraph 25, *op. cit.*, p. 574.) The first quotation would seem to temper Moss's criticism by agreeing with him. Bicknell criticises the imputation of Christ's righteousness as being a "legal fiction", and happily our Article (i.e., Article XI of the Thirty-Nine Articles) like Scripture is silent about it" (*op. cit.*, p. 264.). But Lutheran theologians point to Romans 4:11.

On the other hand Moss deals very fairly with Lutheran theology on the point of justification, bracketing it with Anglican, in such sections as may be found on pp. 195 and 198 of his text.

It is true that in 1559 a Lutheran theologian, Nicholas Amsdorf, went to the extreme of defending the proposition that "Good works are injurious to salvation." He meant this in the sense that they are injurious if considered meritorious in themselves. But his extreme position, liable to serious misinterpretation, was condemned by the Formula of Concord in these words: "We reject and condemn the unqualified expression: Good works are injurious to salvation, as offensive and

detrimental to Christian discipline." (Part I, Chapter IV, Paragraph 17. Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 506.) Not Amsdorf, but the Formula of Concord must be taken as Lutheran theology.

P. M. Dawley in his *Chapters in Church History* deals fairly and accurately with the Lutheran reformation, so as not to create any distorted impressions. And recently the Rt. Rev. J. S. Moyes, Bishop of Armidale (Australia), declared at the Anglican Congress, Minneapolis, 1954, "Do we not need, together with an emphasis on the Sacraments, a deep emphasis on justification by faith?" (reported in *The Living Church*, August 22, 1954, p. 11).

II. THE REAL PRESENCE

Probably no two bodies of Christendom have such affinity in the doctrine of the Eucharist as do the Anglican and the Lutheran communions. A recent tract published by the National Guild of Churchmen, entitled *Corpus Christi*, written by Edward N. Perkins, finds the eucharistic theology of Luther sufficiently congenial to appeal to him twice. Yet here too misunderstandings are present. That careful theologian, C. B. Moss, states, "Consubstantiation is the theory of Luther, that the substance of bread and wine is partly changed and partly remains the same. It cannot be proven by Scripture, and it depends upon the medieval theory of 'substance' and 'accidents'" (*op. cit.*, p. 365).

While the Lutheran symbols do not explicitly reject the doctrine that is commonly described as "consubstantiation," no authoritative Lutheran theologian uses the term to describe the Lutheran position and it is emphatically and explicitly rejected by almost all Lutheran dogmatists. It can be questioned whether any Lutheran seminary in this country has ever taught such a doctrine as Moss describes.

For instance, Abraham Calovius, d.1688, wrote, "We maintain that the body and blood of Christ are present in the Supper, not, indeed, by substantial transmutation, as the Papists hold; nor by consubstantiation, which the Calvinists calumniously charge against us. . . ." (IX, 307, quoted in Schmid, *Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, p. 579).

The statement of the Augsburg Confession, Article X, is this: "Of the Supper of the Lord they [the Lutheran confessors] teach that the true body and blood of Christ are truly present under the form of bread and wine, and are there communicated to those that eat in the Lord's Supper."

It will be of interest to Anglicans to have this sacramental statement amplified in the words of the Formula of Concord (Part I, Chapter VII, Paragraphs 6, 7, 15, 16, Jacobs, *op. cit.*, pp. 511 f). 1. "We believe, teach and confess that, in the Holy Supper the body and blood of Christ are truly and essentially present, and are truly distributed and received with the bread and wine."

2. "We believe, teach and confess that the words of the testament of Christ are not to be understood otherwise than as they sound, according to the letters; so that the bread does not signify the absent body, and the wine the absent blood of Christ, but that, on account of the sacramental union, they are truly the body and blood of Christ."

3. "We believe, teach and confess that the body and blood of Christ are received with the bread and wine, not only spiritually by faith, but also orally; yet not in Capernaitic (as though his flesh were rent with the teeth and digested like other food. John 6:26, 52), but in a supernatural, heavenly mode, because of the sacramental union; as the words of Christ clearly show, where Christ directs to take, eat and drink, as was then done by the apostles . . . i.e., he who eats this bread, eats the body of Christ, which also the chief ancient teachers of the Church, Chrysostom, Cyprian, Leo I, Gregory, Ambrose, Augustine, unanimously testify."

7. "We believe, teach and confess that not only the truly believing [in Christ] and worthy, but also the unworthy and unbelieving, receive the true body and blood of Christ; yet not for life and consolation, but for judgment and condemnation, if they are not converted and do not repent. (I Cor. 11:27, 29.)"

"Of the sacrament of the altar we hold that bread and wine in the Supper are the true body and blood of Christ, and are given and received not only by the godly, but also by wicked Christians" (The Smalcald Articles, Part III, Article VI, Paragraph 1, *op. cit.*, p. 330).

These quotations, although indicative of a scholasticism not usual to Anglican theology, are clear in describing the belief in the objective real presence of our Lord in the Sacrament, and also emphatic in denying that theory known to Anglicans as receptionism. They appear friendly to the majority central Anglican position. They likewise clearly deny the definition of consubstantiation attributed to them.

Bicknell (*op. cit.*, p. 492) has a good word to say for the Lutheran teaching when he states regarding the Real Presence, "This, in some form, is the teaching of the Roman and Eastern Churches, of Luther, of the Fathers and early liturgies, and has always been held by many

within the Church of England. It would appear to be the most consistent with Scripture and the tradition of the Church, and also to be a safeguard of certain great Christian principles."

Bicknell is unwilling to add to the "enormous amount of labour that has been wasted in attempting to get back to the actual words spoken by Christ" and to affirm the manner of the union of the Presence with the communicant in the consecrated elements.

Two other doctrines corollary to that of the Real Presence in the Lutheran system are those of ubiquity and of the communication of attributes. Both have been attacked by Anglican writers.

III. UBIQUITY

"Ubiquitarianism—the theory that our Lord's Manhood is omnipresent, and therefore in the sacrament—was held by some Lutherans, but is contrary to the doctrine that our Lord's Manhood is real manhood, and therefore cannot be omnipresent" (Moss, *op. cit.*, p. 366).

"At the time of the Reformation Luther and certain of his followers maintained that as a result of the Ascension our Lord's humanity had become omnipresent. Against this doctrine known as 'Ubiquitarianism' the wording of our article was devised as a protest [i.e., IV, Articles of Religion.] . . . The Church has never had any difficulty in conceiving of Him, as acting through His humanity in the Holy Eucharist in many places at the same time. But this is not ubiquitarianism. His manhood is not regarded as, so to speak, automatically omnipresent. Rather in each case His activity is a direct act of will in fulfilment of His own promise and in answer to the prayers of the Church. . . . Only the Lutherans have ever pictured Christ's manhood as, so to say, automatically and unconditionally present" (*op. cit.*, pp. 143 f., 495).

It is true that on this point there was considerable diversity among Lutheran theologians of the later sixteenth century. Even the Formula of Concord did not completely settle the matter, but states side by side the conviction of Luther that our Lord is corporeally present everywhere by virtue of the hypostatic union, and the position of Martin Chemnitz (d. 1586) that our Lord can be present corporeally wherever he wishes to be. The position of the Lutheran Chemnitz of the sixteenth century is essentially the same as that of the Anglican Bicknell of the twentieth century. The Formula of Concord explicitly rejects the local extension to all places of heaven and earth of not only the human but also the divine nature of our Lord.

Because of this variance of sixteenth century positions, we shall refer

now to American Lutheran theologians for an answer. The Lutheran Cyclopaedia states that ubiquity is "a term sometimes used to designate the omnipresence of the human nature of Christ, and held by Brenz (d. 1570), but wrongly ascribed to the Lutheran Church" (p. 523).

John Theodore Mueller writes, "... the Reformed . . . charge their Lutheran opponents with teaching the nonsensical view of ubiquity, or of the local extension of the human nature, though the Lutheran theologians have always rejected this as a puerile fancy; for they explain the omnipresence of Christ's human nature not by way of local extension, but by way of His illocal, supernatural mode of presense" (*Christian Dogmatics*, p. 280).

Charles Porterfield Krauth held the same position in his *The Conservative Reformation and its Theology*, and offers the following quotations from the Formula of Concord (p. 131): "Our Church rejects and condemns the error that the human nature of Christ is locally expanded in all places of heaven and earth, or has become an infinite essence." "If we speak of geometric locality and space, the humanity of Christ is not everywhere." "In its proper sense it can be said with truth, Christ is on earth or in His Supper only according to his divine nature, to wit, in the sense that the humanity of Christ by its own nature can not be except in one place, but has the majesty (of co-presence) only from the divinity." "Of a local presence of the body of Christ, in, with, or under the bread, there never was any controversy between the Lutherans and Calvinists; that local presence we expressly reject and condemn in all our writings. But a local absence does not prevent a sacramental presence, which is dependent on the communication of the divine Majesty." Quoting Matt. 28:18, John 13:3 and Eph. 4:10, the Formula of Concord goes on to say, "Hence, being present, he also is able, and to him it is very easy, to impart his true body and blood in the Holy Supper, not according to the mode or property of the human nature, but according to the mode and property of the right hand of God" (Formula of Concord, Part I, Chapter VIII, Paragraph 17, Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 518).

The purpose of this doctrine was to support the doctrine of the Real Presence of the ascended Christ in his completeness in the Eucharist, over against the Calvinistic and Zwinglian ideas that the body of Christ could not be present because such would be contrary to his human nature. Lutheran theologians felt that such teaching bordered on Nestorianism in the Sacrament, by failing to completely unite the human and divine natures in one person. "By this our doctrine, faith and con-

fession the person of Christ is not divided, as it was by Nestorius, who denied the *communicatio idiomatum*, i.e., the true communion of the properties of both natures in Christ, and thus separated the person. . . . Neither are the natures, together with their properties, confounded one with another into one essence, as Eutyches erred; neither is the human nature in the person of Christ denied, or extinguished, nor is either creature changed into the other; but Christ is and remains, for all eternity, God and man in one undivided person, which, next to the Holy Trinity, is the highest mystery, as the Apostle testifies (I Tim. 3:16), upon which our only consolation, life and salvation depend" (Formula of Concord, Part I, Chapter VIII, Paragraph 18, *op. cit.*, p. 519).

Moss, on p. 66, points out that Nestorius denied the *communicatio idiomatum*, and this communication of attributes is a part of Lutheran reasoning regarding the Eucharist and the person of Christ.

A careful inspection shows that Bicknell's and Moss's attributing of a gross ubiquitarianism to the Lutheran Church is based on a misunderstanding, and is denied by reputable Lutheran theologians and by its confessional statements.

IV. THE PRIESTHOOD OF BELIEVERS

"Another idea which Luther held tended further to undermine the sacramental aspects of Christian life. This was the 'Priesthood of All Believers.' Every Christian, according to Luther, shares equally in the Priesthood of Christ. Ministers have certain functions to perform, but they are not agents of Christ in any sense that does not apply equally well to every layman. . . . This concept of the ministry which Luther held ultimately destroys the objectivity of the Sacraments" (Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 215).

It is true that the doctrine of the Ministry, and in the sense that it is dependent thereon, of the Church, differs between Anglican and Lutheran systems. This, however, need not be the point of the above criticism. We wish to point out here only the facts that the Lutheran Church has not, in four centuries, abused the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, nor has it developed a subjective attitude toward the sacraments.

"Concerning Ecclesiastical Order, they teach, that no man should publicly in the Church teach, or administer the Sacraments, except he be rightly called" (Augsburg Confession, Article XIV).

"But if ordination be understood as applying to the ministry of the Word, we are not unwilling to call ordination [Order] a sacrament."

Speaking then of the ministry of the Word as being commanded by God, the Apology of the Augsburg Confession continues by saying, "If ordination [Order] be understood in this way, neither will we refuse to call the imposition of hands a sacrament" (Chapter VII, Article XIII, Paragraphs 11, 12, Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 215). Such ordination may include the imparting of Holy Orders by a bishop, but is not restricted to ordination by someone in bishop's orders.

In much the same way that the Articles of Religion recognize two Sacraments of the Gospel, and five lesser sacraments, so does the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Chapter VII, Article XIII. For instance, "Therefore Baptism, the Lord's Supper and Absolution, which is the sacrament of repentance, are truly sacraments. For these rites have God's command and the promise of grace, which is peculiar to the New Testament" (Paragraph 4, p. 214). It will be noted that here Absolution is listed among the Gospel sacraments.

Continuing regarding Absolution, Article XI of the Augsburg Confession states, "Concerning confession, they teach that private absolution be retained in the churches, though enumeration of all offences be not necessary in confession. For it is impossible; according to the Psalm: 'Who can understand his errors.'" And the Smalcald Articles (Part III, Article VIII, Paragraph 1, *op. cit.*, p. 331) state, "Since absolution or the power of the keys is also a consolation and aid against sin and a bad conscience, appointed by Christ himself in the Gospel, Confession or absolution ought by no means to be abolished in the Church, especially on account of timid consciences and uncultivated youth, in order that they may be heard, and instructed in Christian doctrine. . . . For since private absolution arises from the office of the keys, it should not be neglected, but must be esteemed of the greatest worth, just as all other offices of the Christian Church."

The standard teaching manual of the Lutheran Church throughout the world is the Small Catechism. Its fifth chief part is on Confession, one paragraph of which is this: "Confession embraces two parts. One is that we confess our sins; the other, that we receive absolution, or forgiveness, from the pastor as from God Himself, and in no wise doubt, but firmly believe, that by it our sins are forgiven before God in heaven."

The actual practice of private confession and absolution, however, is a thing but rarely encountered in the Lutheran Church.

It ought to be clear from these confessional statements, as well as from constant practice, that the doctrine of the universal priesthood of

believers has not resulted in opening sacramental ministrations to the unordained, nor in producing a non-sacramental theology. "Objective sacraments" are those which are held to be the real channels of objective grace because of dominical institution. Holy Baptism is held in as high esteem among Lutherans as among Anglicans, and subject to precisely the same abuses. The objectivity of the Eucharist has been discussed in the section on the Real Presence. The Eucharist and Absolution are not used as much as in the Anglican Communion, but this is not due to the doctrine of the priesthood of believers. Rather, the latter, rightly understood, ought greatly to encourage the Eucharist as the normal Lord's Day sacrifice and sacrament. This is the case in the Anglican Communion where the Parish Eucharist has been restored as the central act of Sunday worship, with the people of God all sharing in the sacrifice.

The Anglican Communion, with its apostolic continuity and historic structure; with its balancing catholic and evangelical elements, needs to be aware of the true nature of the Lutheran Church in its weaknesses and its strength. They share much in common, and in parts of Scandinavia have already effected a wholesome degree of fellowship. That fellowship needs to be encouraged.

THE CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC OF JAMES FRANKLIN BETHUNE-BAKER

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The word "modernism" has for many today a bad connotation; they feel that it describes an attempt to commend Christianity to our age by reducing it to a vague ethical theism in which Jesus Christ occupies the role only of a great prophet and teacher. However accurate this may be as a description of American, British, and German "liberal Protestantism", it is not true of the majority of British and American Anglican theologians, who in one way or another have been associated with the "modernist movement." These men were, and are, so deeply immersed in the institutional and sacramental life of the Church that any vague ethical theism is utterly alien to their spirit; rather, they are

deeply concerned—out of the very depth and richness of the Church's tradition of which they are part—to re-think the historic faith and to find ways of re-stating that faith which will make it meaningful to men and women of our own time. If this is considered by some to involve necessarily a "reduction of historical Christianity", the words of the subject of this essay may be quoted in reply:

"This refashioned Christianity . . . humanist and evolutionist as it will be, will yet be permeated and controlled by the consciousness of God as personal (which means a God transcending the process in which he is none the less inherent, for personality in us means that we too in our measure are conscious of a similar transcendence), and of Christ as the supreme manifestation of him that has emerged in the process, and the medium of the true knowledge of God and man in all their relationships with one another. I cannot see how reinterpretation of our formularies on these lines can give us as our religion a Christianity that could be called 'reduced', unless it is by the quantity rather than the quality of its beliefs that the Christianity of our religion is to be measured."

In this quotation we have already three of the points which we shall mention in this study as characteristic of Dr. Bethune-Baker: (1) a "humanist" interpretation of Christianity, by which he means one that always relates its theological affirmations to man, his nature, and his needs; (2) an "evolutionist" interpretation, by which he means one that takes full account of the developmental, epigenetic understanding both of our religion and of the world-order; and (3) an interpretation of Christianity which emphasizes the "emergence" of Christ within the process, yet also emphasizes him as one who gives us the true revelation of the deepest significance of that process in which God is "inherent." We shall have more to say on each of these points later on.

Dr. Bethune-Baker was chosen as the subject of this essay for the immediate reasons given below; he was also chosen because he was without doubt the most learned historian of Christian doctrine in the Anglican Communion in his time. His great work on the subject remains even today the best survey of Christian theology from New Testament times to A. D. 461, by an English-writing scholar; it is still widely used in theological seminaries and graduate departments of religion. But most of those who know and value Bethune-Baker's scholarly writings are unaware of his significant contribution to the task of re-thinking Christianity. It is with the aspect of his life and work that we are here concerned.

In his appreciation of the distinguished Cambridge theologian, Henry Barclay Swete, Bethune-Baker remarked that he himself owed most, among all his teachers, to Bishop Westcott of Durham, during the days when Westcott was teaching at Cambridge as one of the great "Cambridge three"—Lightfoot, Hort, and Westcott. An indication of this debt it to be found in Bethune-Baker's constant stress on our Lord as *Christus Consummator* as well as Saviour of men; the now-forgotten but highly important sermons delivered by Westcott at Westminster Abbey and later published under that very title suggest from the New Testament most of the themes which his disciple later developed in his discussion of Christianity as the focus and principle of meaning in God's revelation of himself to men. On the other hand, the scientific assurance that ours is indeed a developing—or as he liked to put it, "epigenetic"—world added another and important element to his thought. This combination of theological awareness with keen interest in work done outside the theological field was characteristic of Bethune-Baker; and it is precisely the failure of much modern theology to combine these two which makes his contribution so telling, and such a valuable corrective, in our own day.

I have been moved by two recent experiences to write this essay in appreciation of the theological work of James Franklin Bethune-Baker, for a quarter of this century Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, whose death at the advanced age of ninety occurred in 1951. The first was my reading of a new survey of Anglican Christological thinking during this century, in which no reference whatsoever was made to Bethune-Baker nor indeed to any of the "modernist school". The second experience was the opportunity provided me of working through Bethune-Baker's *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, in order to produce a much abridged edition of this book which the Seabury Press has just published in pamphlet form. I believe, as I have said, that the Cambridge theologian was not only one of the most learned historians of doctrine in our time, but that his writings are suggestive and helpful in the essential task of re-working and re-stating the main essentials of Christian theology. In a period when "orthodoxy" is the mood, it is salutary to re-read Bethune-Baker. He knew the theological tradition as did few men of our age; he also knew that a simple "return to 'orthodoxy'" is not the solution of our present theological difficulty, and he saw the lines along which a theological reconstruction may, and must, be accomplished—even if at this and that particular point we must differ with him.

As J. S. Bezzant pointed out many years ago, in reviewing *The Way of Modernism*, Bethune-Baker's sympathies were with "Catholic Modernism" and not with "liberal Protestantism." He had a strong sense of the Church, a deep appreciation of its sacramental life, a vivid awareness of the long tradition of Christian thought and experience; and he never tired of insisting that any reconstruction must be within "the ancient Churches", for he was a loyal son of the Church of England.

This union of Catholic sensitivity, participation in the life of the Church, and alertness to the new world of thought, make Bethune-Baker an extraordinarily interesting writer. Some will think that he was far too enthusiastic for the evolutionary point-of-view and applied it with much too generous a sweep; but others of us must think that it is precisely in the failure of the neo-orthodoxy of our time, in both its Catholic and Protestant dress, to take due account of the revolution which the evolutionary perspective has brought about, that such neo-orthodoxy has failed to make contact with the actual thought of our contemporaries and has often seemed to be in the position of hanging on, through all sorts of theological devices, to a merely verbal orthodoxy. In any event, this essay is an attempt to sketch the main emphases in Bethune-Baker's programme for theological revision.

The writing of Bethune-Baker covered a wide area of theological study. His first book was a consideration of the Christian attitude to war and peace. His distinguished essay on the ethical significance of Christian doctrines was published in *Cambridge Theological Essays* (1905), but was preceded by a study of the meaning of the *homousion* which appeared in *Cambridge Texts and Studies* in 1901. His work on *Nestorius and his Teaching* was published in 1908—this was the book which demonstrated that Nestorius did not in fact hold the views condemned under his name. Meanwhile the *Early History of Christian Doctrine* appeared (1903 and following—last edition 1951); it went through nearly a dozen editions, with new material added from time to time as research in this field progressed, and it is still the best English work on the subject. *The Miracle of Christianity* came out in 1914. A moving appreciation of his friend and colleague Henry Barclay Swete was included in *Henry Barclay Swete: A Remembrance* (1919). *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, a study of "the religious construction" of the articles of that creed, was first published in 1919. "Religious Values of the Idea of a Future Life," was included in the King's College *Lectures on Immortality* (1920). A collection of oc-

casional essays which had first appeared in various periodicals, as well as addresses before clerical groups, came out in 1927 under the title of *The Way of Modernism*. This was followed by *The New View of Christianity: Letters to an Enquiring Layman* (1930), dealing with problems raised for lay people by the newer knowledge in relation to the Church's faith, and *Early Traditions about Jesus* (1930), an able survey of the earliest material about the life of our Lord with a reconstruction of the figure of Jesus as the early Church saw him. Finally, a little booklet called *Unity and Truth in the Church of England* appeared in 1934. Besides these books and pamphlets, Bethune-Baker contributed a number of articles to *The Modern Churchman*, *The Journal of Theological Studies* (of which he was editor for thirty years), *The Edinburgh Review*, and other periodicals.

I have read and studied this entire *corpus*, with the exception of a few reviews and essays which are not available in this country and which I have not been able to find in Britain. With this as a background, I am prepared to say that the "silent treatment" accorded Bethune-Baker in most theological circles is both short-sighted and self-defeating. He was a great scholar, a holy man, a kindly friend and never-failing helper to his students at Cambridge—just this week I have heard some stories, about his generosity and Christian spirit, from an old pupil of his. Above all, he was a man of deep faith who believed that Christianity needed but a fair, compelling, and intelligible presentation to commend itself to the anxious, faith-seeking world of his day.

It is my own conviction that one reason for the "silent treatment" to which I have referred was that those who stood for more conservative views knew quite well that Bethune-Baker could meet them on their own ground and show their inadequacy in the field of developing Christian doctrine. Most of them doubtless did not wish to risk the annihilation which Bishop Gore suffered at the hands of Hastings Rashdall when he ventured to attack Rashdall's teaching on the ground that it was not consistent with the historic fathers of the faith (see H. Rashdall, *God and Man*). No one could say of Bethune-Baker (or Rashdall either, for that matter) that he was ignorant of the older orthodoxy, of its values and of its defects. The better course was to say nothing; and so the important contributions of Bethune-Baker have been overlooked or forgotten.

Bethune-Baker's main objection to conventional orthodoxy, as he found it in writers like Bishop Gore (whom he once described as "one

of the noblest and most persuasive exponents of some convictions that all Christians share, and the most competent apologist of lost theological causes, that I know"), was that it set up what he termed a "fixity" of theological language which is impossible "when we are dealing with living human hearts and minds and the religious interpretation of live human experience." Furthermore, he felt that the emphasis on, or acquiescence in, ideas of unnatural wonder, catastrophic intrusion, *contra*-natural ideas of the *super*-natural, and the like, not only made the Christian religion seem outlandish and incredible but also failed to do justice to the Judaeo-Christian conception of the divine consistency which has its secular counterpart in the scientific understanding of the world as a pattern or movement which develops epigenetically. If, in his reaction from this "fixity" and this intrusionist theology, he over-emphasized on occasion the developmental and evolutionary side of nature and history and human experience, he balanced this on other occasions by his ready admission of the unexpected and unprecedented. Only he always held that everything must be seen in the light of the immanent purpose of God manifest in Christ—an immanent purpose which requires a transcendent principle, since in our own experience, personality is transcendent over the experience in which, immanently, it is at work.

There are, I believe, eight main themes running through Bethune-Baker's writing on theological reconstruction. I shall list them, then discuss them *seriatim*, with quotations to illustrate his position, taken largely from *The Way of Modernism* and *The New View of Christianity* (his most readable popular works), and with the suggestion that the reader take the opportunity to study *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, for an interesting development of these themes.

1. Our theological reconstruction must be "within" the historic Church, preserving continuity of thought and (so far as may be) of expression.

2. We must accept wholeheartedly the assured results of natural and social science, as well as the findings of reasonable biblical criticism; this inevitably demands the re-ordering of much of our thinking about religious and theological questions.

3. The concept of God, central to all religion, must be understood as involving, much more seriously than has hitherto been the case, his close connection with and constant operation in the processes of nature and history; an "absentee" God, or one who only occasionally "intrudes" into the world, is impossible.

4. Miracle, in the usually accepted sense of "violations" of nature, is not a religious conception and must be discarded in favour of a basic continuity of the divine action, due allowance being made for the experienced fact of "unexpected" and "novel" emergences within that greater continuity.

5. The Incarnation is the centre of the Christian faith, with the Cross at its heart; and this must be understood not only as the historical reality upon which Christianity is based but also as the Christian principle for interpreting the world.

6. The value of the traditional creeds is found in their "religious construction" rather than in what is often called their "literal meaning."

7. Absolute integrity of mind and a sense of reality must be the characteristics of the theologian, rather than wishful thinking, special pleading, and unwillingness to follow the facts wherever they may lead.

8. Coupled with all these, as we indicated in No. 1, is unswerving loyalty to the Anglican Communion and its "comprehensive" catholicity which must mark the Anglican theologian who seeks to re-interpret and re-vivify the Church's accepted faith.

(1.) "None of us . . . harbours any idea of a new church or a new religion", wrote Bethune-Baker. And again, Modernism "holds that the Christian revelation is not the revelation of a number of intellectual truths or propositions of a rational kind, but is the revelation of a way of life, an attitude of life and all its interests and activities, and therefore is social", which means that it also "holds that this revelation is only to be understood and realized in a society with an ordered life of its own. And further, because it is convinced that in the historical society of the Church, whatever its formulas, there has always been true Christian experience, it cannot contemplate any severance from that stream of life. The synthesis it aims at must be effected in the Church itself." Similar quotations might be made from *The New View of Christianity* and above all from *Unity and Truth in the Church of England*, where the author was particularly insistent on the perennial importance and the necessary centrality of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

Dr. Bethune-Baker believed that "catholicity" in this sense is an absolute necessity in religious development. He emphasized that Christianity is a living and growing tradition, that it is (as he said) a chief concern of the genuine Christian modernist to work for "natural change and development" within the established Christian community.

As an Anglican, he found that the Church of England and its sister-communions provide a peculiar opportunity for exactly this movement of thought and this growth in understanding, for it is there that "a new presentation of Christianity" can be made which will not "sweep away all ancient landmarks and institutions." If the historic Christian tradition is to be saved, "we must remember that we can only save by serving." And "the Church of England is so splendidly worth saving in its unique historical character."

But not merely must the institution as institution, with its rites and sacraments, be valued; the ancient formularies also have their own peculiar significance in an historical tradition. "Our religion is the Incarnation, the God-Man, the Cross the way of Life". "Let us have no attempts, at present, at formal replacement of anything like the official authority of the technical terms of traditional Christianity. It is not in that way that the re-fashioning we want can be done. Let us not seek to find other terms for Incarnation, Sin, Forgiveness, Atonement, Resurrection, Salvation, Eternal Life, Communion of Saints, Heaven and Hell, or any of our technical terms. Let us rather go on as we have been doing, interpreting, explaining, openly repudiating some meanings which in the past have been connected with particular terms and expressions, keeping them as part of the common stock of our religious language". Above all, the ideas found in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are to be given their right and central place.

So the theology which will emerge from this thorough effort at reconstruction will be continuous with the ancient faith of the Church, embodied in the historical life of the Christian community, and nourished by the sacraments and other ties which are part of our common Christian heritage.

(2.) Yet while we must take our stance within the ancient Church, we must at the same time be alert to the new truth which has come to us from the natural sciences, from social studies, and from the critical approach to the Christian scriptures. There is no need to document this point, since it is found on practically every page of the books we are considering. Dr. Bethune-Baker believed that Christian theologians have not yet been willing to take due account of the new understanding of the whole creative process, the aeons of development which are behind the emergence of man, the long movement of human history itself with all that this suggests as to the background of a viable Christian anthropology. In an article on Dr. N. P. Williams' Bampton

Lectures, he criticized the work because it did not give sufficient attention to the way in which our ideas of man's nature must inevitably be affected by our recognition of the process of human development, from the most primitive man up to the most civilized, with the consequent need to recognize also the mythical nature of the biblical accounts of man's creation and the pictorial quality which must attach to any deductions which are made from these accounts.

As to biblical study, Dr. Bethune-Baker expressed his views in a paper read to a clerical society in 1925, reprinted in *The Way of Modernism*. Due recognition was given to the variety of scriptural writing, attention was drawn to the place of legend and myth, the findings of more recent form-criticism were anticipated in the sketch of the gospels and their historical valicity (Bethune-Baker carried on this kind of critical study in his excellent little volume *Early Traditions about Jesus*, one of the best popular works of its kind). Yet it remained true for him that the Bible, "which is permeated with the sense of the purpose and will of God, and even represents that purpose as having had already once its proleptic realization in the person of our Lord", still has meaning and force, and its words and stories become to the believer "the very words of God." But recognition of the facts of biblical research and the conclusions which must be drawn from it mean that our traditional theology must be re-worked, for we cannot now accept as historical much that was thought to be such, and we see that some of the ideas associated with traditional doctrines are in fact plainly not true. This he felt to be, above all, the situation with regard to Christological doctrines; "frank teaching is the way to save" many of the gospel narratives and sayings, and to guarantee their "religious value for the future."

(3.) When we come to consider the concept of Deity, we find much in Bethune-Baker which anticipates the writing of such contemporary thinkers as Charles Hartshorne in his *Divine Relativity* and others of the so-called "process philosophy" school. Our author would remove once for all the idea of God as spatially transcendent and aloof from the world of his creation. Indeed he insisted that the very word "creation" should always be employed in the present tense, for it is a constant activity of a present living God who is immanently at work in the whole process. Yet immanence does not exhaust what we mean when we say God, for he is more than and other than the world in which he is ever at work. "God must have as his characteristic at its highest power a controlling directive transcendence analogous to that

of which we ourselves are conscious." The "evolutionist revelation of our times . . . supports the idea that the whole process is one in which spirit is ordering and organizing, towards the production of higher orders of being, higher qualities of life." Directing that process, energizing through it and constantly operative within it, is God himself. "God is in the process, indwelling. The whole universe is not merely the scene of his operations but a manifestation of him, in all the stages of its evolution." "We are lead by a continuous chain from the lower to the higher in the evolution of human personality, till we come to the one manifestation in which men have most truly found and seen and known God."

It is in the sphere of human life and in the movement of human history that we are enabled to discern most clearly what is at the heart of the creative process. Man is not cut off from the world from which he is an emergent, and God is not separated from his world but present within it. It is, therefore, in the area of man's experience—above all, in the experience of which Jesus Christ was the centre—that we are given the clue to the meaning of it all.

(4.) But this implies that the older idea of miracle, as involving intrusive violations of God's ordinary ways of working, is not a religious conception at all, but a contradiction of the deepest insight of religion—and above all of the Christian religion. "Breaks in our lives, sudden 'intrusions' of various kinds, do often happen. They are the obvious facts that anyone can see." Yet while "any true *rationale* of life must include them in its survey", it is also true that they are able to be included within the picture of a world in which God is pervasively at work. "I must affirm my conviction that it can never be a mark of piety to believe in any particular miracle recorded, in the past or in the present, when explanations of the origin of the belief are forthcoming that do not involve ideas about the universe and man's life-history in it and God's ways of working out his purposes, that our general knowledge today does not confirm."

The crucial problem in regard to miracle is of course the stories told about the life of our Lord. Dr. Bethune-Baker handled this problem in the following fashion: "I have no doubt that some of the stories in our gospels have their origin in the attempt to explain human experiences of an impressive and elusive kind by reference to powers and activities of a higher order than the known and natural. There was an established fashion in these matters, which still survives among those who have not become wholly habituated to the fashion of thought

which has gradually spread since Copernicus and Newton and Darwin. And so the unknown quantity of which his contemporaries were aware in Jesus was accounted for by stories such as that of the Nativity; and some of his own experiences and their experiences in connection with him—the elusive quality of which ordinary measures could not cope with—experiences of which nowadays we should try to find a psychic account, were described in terms of events or occurrences of a wonderful character in the sphere of sense and sight and sound. To dismiss these stories as worthless, when we are seeking a true valuation of Jesus himself and the whole experience of which he was the centre, is to shut one's eyes to some of the bits of evidence we have about him and the impression he produced. It is not the mark of the scientific enquirer to do so. It is not 'pitiful sophistry' to use these stories as evidence of the kind I have indicated in making up our account of Jesus and the gospel history. They come to us in the vesture of fairy-land, or from the realm of poetry and picture; but experience of men and women like ourselves underlies them, and they help us to estimate the character and quality of that experience."

What we *cannot* do, Dr. Bethune-Baker insisted, is "to allow them to control our conception of God in the universe, or of the course of nature, or of the methods in which he is actually manifested in the cosmic process and human history."

5.) We turn now to the Incarnation, which for Bethune-Baker was central to the whole Christian complex of faith and life. He interpreted it along the lines of the *Logos* Christology, a whole section of one of his essays being devoted to a compelling re-statement of this patristic teaching. The gospel which for him had highest *theological* significance is John; and it is the teaching of the prologue of this gospel which led him to support the *Logos* Christology.

First of all, it is important to consider Dr. Bethune-Baker's views on the historical basis for Christological speculation. From the comprehensive study in *Early Traditions about Jesus*, we discover that the author would see much quite definite historical material for the doctrine of Christ. Our Lord was a great teacher, with a message which combined the severity of the old prophets, with their eschatological warnings, and an ethical teaching of extreme beauty and dignity. He taught love as the way of life both in this world and in the coming Kingdom. But this does not exhaust the impression made by the historic Jesus. There was about him, as he walked in Palestine, some awful presence, some unknown quality, which called forth fear and

yet had a strange attraction. He was, somehow, central to his own message, and "there was a veil of mystery surrounding him, suggesting much more than met the eye or found expression in act and word." Indeed, in a large sense "it was to account for this mystery and suggestiveness, part of the actual experience of those who knew him in his lifetime in the world, that the later explanations and doctrines of the Church were devised."

Beyond this, however, Dr. Bethune-Baker declared that Christ has held a central place in men's hearts and minds because Christians came "on the one hand to see in the death of Jesus on the Cross the means of their redemption or salvation, and on the other hand to regard him as so closely associated with God that it was at once true that God the Father gave his beloved Son to die for men and that the Son loved them and gave himself for them." And no matter how it may be interpreted, the Resurrection was crucial for Christian faith; and thus, it was by Christ's action—in the deepest sense—that the Christian Church came into existence. "He brought it into being with himself as a centre of it, and he said that in the Spirit he would always be with his disciples."

Upon such an historic foundation Dr. Bethune-Baker saw the rise of Christological speculation. Who could it be that had brought these things to pass? It was in the attempt to answer this question, with loyalty to the full implications of the experience of new life in and through Christ (especially as indicated in that original experience of which Christ was the centre), that the later doctrines developed, reaching their culmination in the Chalcedonian definition: two natures united in one person.

With this historical background, Dr. Bethune-Baker moved on, in his other works, to his doctrinal reconstruction. His fundamental claim was that on any showing Christ must be used to interpret the whole range of reality. "Truth as truth is in Jesus is not only truth about Jesus . . . it is, for Christians, truth about the whole mystery of life, about God and man and the world." Such a truth is "based on actual happenings on this homely earth of ours and the actual experience of men and women like ourselves." The central significance of Christ, then, when our Lord is interpreted as "pre-eminently the Son of God, one with God in mind and purpose and will—in all, that is to say, that makes up what we call our being—living and dying for the salvation of the world," is that "we have set forth to us, as in no other way, the conception of Love as the very heart of the universe, the

spring of all life that is really life, and so the key to the meaning of all our experience here."

In other words, Dr. Bethune-Baker insisted that the doctrine of the Incarnation must be set in the context of a world order which is "a manifestation of God, in all the stages of its evolution." "The whole is incarnation." From this position, he said, it will be seen that there can be no fundamental dualism between God and man, since the two are "indissolubly inter-related." "The Creator is not separated from his creatures; they do not exist apart from him. They have their origin in the will and love of God." Our Lord cannot be understood as "a bolt from the blue," but rather as one who gives meaning to that structure of Reality from which he appears.

It is recognized that such a philosophical interpretation of Christ is not explicitly found in Jesus' own teaching, but Dr. Bethune-Baker was not one of those who would regard doctrinal speculation and statement as contrary to the Spirit of Christ. Of course developed doctrine cannot be found in Jesus' teaching. "What is more to the point is that it is he and his life—his experience as man in the world, his consciousness of himself so far as we can read it, with the new consciousness in us which he created—that suggests it."

From this point, we may turn to a more precise discussion of the historic Incarnation in Christ. What is to be maintained is that our Lord is "the manifestation of the one true God and the way of life for mankind." Christ, therefore, is completely human—one who through and through is man, in body, mind, and soul; and yet is uniquely divine. Dr. Bethune-Baker would interpret this human-divine person in the light of an incarnational-evolutionary philosophy; thus in our Lord we have man at his highest and we have God most fully revealed in and to men.

It is only through the highest humanity that God is most fully manifested; human nature is "capable" of deity, and in its perfection God, who of course is not just "human nature at its best," is adequately (so far as man is concerned) active and disclosed. The *Logos* theology which Dr. Bethune-Baker supported is of special value here. "Our Lord [is] the fullest expression of Divine Personality that is possible under the conditions of genuinely human life, the embodiment of God and man, creating a new consciousness in man and new channels through which the power of God has since been operative in the world."

Dr. Bethune-Baker wrote that for him the belief in the Godhead of Christ meant that when he knew Jesus he knew God. Occasionally he

stated this truth in somewhat extravagantly Christocentric terms, but elsewhere this was safeguarded. For him our Lord never ceased to be man; but from Christ he learned of God as well as of man. "He becomes for me merged, as it were, in God, or identical with God." He was prepared to use the words of Baron von Hügel (in his address on "Christianity and the Supernatural"), in which our Lord is seen as the implied "goal and centre" of all natural-supernatural experience, that one in whom there is as much of God as may be expressed in genuine human nature. So it is legitimate, indeed necessary, to adore him as "God-Man." Dr. Bethune-Baker, it is clear, would have subscribed whole-heartedly to Gwatkin's great assertion that Jesus Christ is one who is as divine as God and as human as any man. Less than that, we cannot rest content; more than that, Christian belief does not demand.

(6.) The central beliefs of the Christian Church have been expressed in creeds. But these creeds contain statements the historical validity of which is open to question; they are often cast in terms which are difficult and sometimes impossible to "check." So many moderns think. What then is to be our attitude towards these traditional documents, especially those of us who are in a religious society in which the creeds are constantly being used in services of worship? Dr. Bethune-Baker developed, in *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, and re-affirmed in *The Way of Modernism* and *The New View of Christianity*, the thesis that the basic meaning of the ancient creeds is to be found in what he termed their "religious construction" as distinguished from the apparent literal meaning of the words. The position may be illustrated by a quotation from *The New View*: "The historic evidence for the belief [in the Virgin Birth] is, in my opinion, of the flimsiest, and it encourages a view of the actual method of God's working in the world which I believe to be untrue. But it does affirm, in the one particular case, just that synthesis of God and man which is at the heart of the Christian religion and central to its philosophy of life." That is to say, the "religious construction" of the phrases, "conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary", is the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, not the assertion (doubtless meant "literally" by the makers of the creed) that Jesus was conceived without human father. The "real meaning for religion" of these and other phrases in the ancient creeds can thus be preserved, despite the fact that in many instances the probabilities are against a literal accuracy.

In *The Faith of the Apostles' Creed*, Bethune-Baker worked through

the whole of that profession of faith, with side-glances at the so-called Nicene Creed as well, and showed that a proper understanding of the basic intentionality of the Church in each of the several articles can well be gained by concentration on this "religious construction." Often, he pointed out in *The Way of Modernism*, "we find that an old 'formula' has a far wider application and a deeper verification than those who used it in the past could know." He would therefore urge that "more and more we fill our Christian ideograms with new content"; when we do this, we find that "they bear the pressure," for they "are not like wine-skins." At the same time, Bethune-Baker recognized the difficulty that many find in the creeds and understood that his own attitude to them was due to "long familiarity with the creeds and the history of the making of them that has bred in me this respect for them and the desire to wrest from them their real meaning for religion." For others, he agreed, "it may seem an un-natural way of dealing with them."

What then about new creeds to replace the ancient and established ones? Answering questions put to him by the editor of *The Modern Churchman*, Bethune-Baker wrote: "I hold that a Church must stand for some definite convictions, and that these must be convictions capable of being stated as a creed. I do not think that the common convictions for which the Church stands could be stated by any selections from the words of Christ, nor that they can be stated except in a form analogous to that of the ancient creeds—the implications of those convictions being left to be drawn out from them rather than expressed in credal form. It does not seem possible or desirable to revise or re-write any of the ancient creeds, nor to continue to use them for any other purpose than as devotional canticles and historical landmarks. Yet the recitation of a creed gives point to the action of worship that nothing else can give, and a creed is of real value for the purpose of instruction. I think that an adaption of phrases from the ancient creeds, with perhaps some slight modernizations, might furnish a sufficient creed for a re-united Church—something like the following:

"I believe in God, Maker of all things visible and invisible; And in Jesus Christ, his Son, our Lord, God manifest in human life, crucified for us, risen from the dead, ascended into heaven. And in the Spirit of the Father and the Son: One Holy Catholic Church, one Baptism unto forgiveness of sins, one Eucharist, one Fellowship of the Faithful: And in the life of the world to come."

(7.) The constant insistence of Dr. Bethune-Baker on the need for

absolute integrity of mind and a sense of reality in theology has been sufficiently illustrated by previous quotations. Even if we disagree with what he said, we can feel the honesty, the sincerity, and the deep conviction which were behind it; and we can also see that the one thing that he most feared was that religion should become a disconnected and purely "ideal" matter, without contact with the real world in which men live. It is this which is behind his interest in the "humanism" which he discerned in the Christian faith. He did not mean humanism in the sense which would put man at the centre of things, rather than God; what he did mean was that we must start our theologizing from the sheer facts of human experience of God and his revelation of himself to men, not from theorizings which bear little or no relation to that experience and revelation. This also explains his rejection of "the old antinomies of a natural sphere and a supernatural sphere," and his dislike of the notion of "an irruption of one sphere into the other." For him, "the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation implies that the process of human life is at once and inseparably both human and divine, at once both 'from below' and 'from above'."

Christianity, he believed, fires "its faith . . . on God as the ground of all being and creative activity, manifested in the universe, and in man, however partially, yet more fully than in aught else. In every man by his very nature and constitution, there is a faint image of Godhead. In Jesus—his personality and character and life—there was a full image, and so in him we bow down before and worship Godhead in its most visible human embodiment." "I could not recognize as 'Christian' a religion that was not dominated by the belief that the idea of 'Incarnation' is the key to the understanding of ourselves and the whole historic process of the world. God is the ground of it all, and God is Spirit. The belief that in Jesus—not only through his teaching and life, but actually *in* him as a man among men, not isolated from them, but one of them—the truth about God and man and the world was made manifest seems to me to be central and vital for Christianity. We may go on using the antitheses God and Man, the spiritual and the material; but it is in the God-Man that Christianity sees the truth. So, in Jesus God and man are seen at one. This at-one-ment is an achievement, if the word may be used, on the plane of history, both of God and of man. And it is thereafter brought within the reach of all men."

It is this insistence which gives its reality and its "humanism" to the Christian faith; and with it is for Bethune-Baker the corollary that the

beliefs summed up in the phrases "resurrection of Christ, ascension into heaven, session at the right hand of God, coming of the Spirit" affirm something about Jesus "that I do not think Christianity can ever cease to affirm. It is that death was not the end of him. His life was not limited to its brief span of visible activity on earth; his personality was freed from the limitations of space and time, and yet able to make itself felt in time and space. He was present in his Spirit . . . His reading of the meaning of human life, his estimates and valuations of things, were true; and his Spirit will be the strength and inspiration of his 'disciples'—and it is at once the Spirit of man and the Spirit of God."

(8.) Mention has been made, in No. 1, of Dr. Bethune-Baker's unswerving loyalty to the Anglican Church and his belief that its "catholicity" provides opportunity for precisely the kind of re-statement of Christian faith which he believed to be essential for this age. An extended quotation will reinforce this estimate of our writer: "The ancient Church of England was re-fashioned by the march of events and the peculiar genius of the English people in such strange wise as to preserve its continuity, and retain all the characteristic features of historical Christianity, while adapting in various ways its constitution and teaching to the new conditions and ideas of the time. So, having lived as it seems almost from hand to mouth for more than a hundred years, it found itself established in the unique position in Christendom that it has occupied since and occupies today. Catholic and Protestant, primitive, medieval, and reformed, respecting antiquity and all that we call 'tradition'; but not inaccessible to fresh knowledge and new movements; tenacious of the faith once delivered to the saints, but claiming no infallibility for the interpretations even of the most august assemblies of the faithful in the past. 'General Councils may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God' (Article xxi). By its history in the past, by the very personality and character its special experience have developed in it, it seems to be marked out as the destined representative of an organic Christianity continuously developing and shaping itself anew to meet the constantly changing conditions of knowledge and thought and life that determine for men the real world, generation after generation, that confronts them."

It is, we thus see, as a churchman and a loyal churchman, that Bethune-Baker would undertake the work of theological revision. He had little patience with efforts to re-interpret the Christian faith

without adherence to the community and without adherence to the traditional doctrines so far as these express the continuing Christian experience of God in Christ—that the Godhead is “one in plurality” and that God is specially apprehended in Christ.

If this were an exhaustive outline and evaluation of the theological contribution of Bethune-Baker, there would necessarily be critical comments. We should point out, for instance, that in his occasional hypostatization of ideals and values and the equation of these with God, there is a hidden danger. Probably Bethune-Baker was aware of this; and used these ideas only to make the conception of God more readily understandable to his readers or hearers. We should also wish to say that there is sometimes an extreme Christocentrism in his view of God; yet it must also be noted that this is carefully balanced by what he has to say of the revelation of God in many areas of nature, history, life, and experience. Now and again he seems to build too much on the assurances of an evolutionary world-view; yet he grounds this in a profoundly theological interpretation of existence and insists that while science can of course not discern God as such at work in the process, faith can and does see him there and reads the whole movement in terms of God, his purpose and his will.

The purpose of this essay, however, is not to make these and other critical comments, but to commend to others the whole approach and the honesty and sincerity of the way in which the task is undertaken. It will irritate many of our contemporaries to read Bethune-Baker; they will think of him as too concerned with the humane values of the Christian tradition, too optimistic about man's ultimate destiny, too ready to listen to what science in its various fields has to say. But perhaps they will also come to recognize that here is one series of suggestions about Christian re-statement which must at the least be met and answered. And perhaps they will agree with the writer of this essay that there is much here which is of quite extraordinary value and which points the way for fruitful theological study.

PREDESTINATION AND DETERMINISM

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The problem of the relation of Predestination and Determinism is an interesting one because implicit in the relation is the whole problem of the tension between theology and philosophy. To the popular mind predestination is just another word for determinism. This is true because of the unconscious and sometimes necessary subordination of revealed and theological truths to categories of thought. The popular mind is not aware of this subordination and confusion often results. And, for that matter, many theologians and religious thinkers have had a distaste for the doctrine of predestination on account of a preconceived notion that it was to be equated with theistic determinism. Such an abhorrence of predestination reflects an extreme rationalistic interpretation of the doctrine or it shows an innocent naïveté in the minds of theologians and laymen alike. To ignore the problem is not to receive insight into the problem.

When predestination is identified with determinism, this new identity is set over against freedom as its opposite. Freedom is considered to be the opposite of both predestination and determinism. This error makes an understanding of the tension between the two impossible. There is no problem if both mean the same. To equate the two is to ignore the problem.

It will be the burden of this essay to attempt a recapture of the tension between predestination and determinism. In doing this the two terms will be set over against each other. Predestination means something infinitely more than philosophic determinism. In reality the doctrine of predestination is the theological expression not only of man's freedom, but also of man's final destiny, which is the fulfilment of his freedom. Therefore, the nature of philosophic determinism will be discussed in relation to the freedom of man, and the doctrine of predestination will be considered as the opposite of philosophic determinism and as the fulfilment of man's freedom.

The philosophy of the Greeks, which influenced the mediaeval thinkers so greatly, demonstrates better than any other philosophical discipline a doctrine of determinism at a very high level. Their

doctrine was noble, because in a personage like Socrates, it transcended a crude materialism and natural determinism, and was what might be termed an ethical determinism or a determinism of virtue. The profound teaching of Socrates and later of Plato and Aristotle, and even the Christian thinker, St. Thomas Aquinas, has had a tremendous influence in the history of philosophy and is quite popular today.

What is this teaching and why is it the best example of philosophic determinism? From a study of the Platonic dialogues, especially the earlier ones, it can be observed that Socrates taught that virtue consists in the knowledge of the good. To possess knowledge of the good is tantamount to doing the good. Knowledge of the good causes an individual to do good and therefore to be virtuous and happy. No one wills to do evil. No one does wrong purposely. If anyone does wrong, it is because the intellect has failed to furnish the will of man with the proper information. Knowledge determines the will without opposition from the will. The will is in bondage to the intellect and does what the intellect dictates.

In such a scheme sin is error or intellectual defect. To be in a state of sin is to be in a state of ignorance. But, if sin is ignorance, the will cannot be held responsible for its action. The will is not free. Man's action is determined by his knowledge of the good.

This is essentially the Socratic position and it sums up the philosophic determinism of the Greeks—a very high type of determinism, since man is in bondage to the good, but nevertheless a determinism which negates the free will of man. Strictly speaking, there is no freedom in Greek philosophy.

The Scholastics of the Middle Ages, especially St. Thomas Aquinas, fell prey to this error of the Greeks. In general Aquinas regarded the will in accordance with the Socratic dictum. It is determined by the good. The intellect not only apprehends in general the idea of the good, but also, in each individual case, discerns what is good, and thereby determines the will (Windelband). The will strives for that which is good and is necessarily determined by the intellect. However, St. Thomas was Christian enough to allow that in individual cases the will, through belief, has an influence.

This type of theory is popular because it takes the sting out of sin. Man is usually willing to give up his free will in order to avoid the responsibilities of his free choice. As noble as the argument is, and certainly the promulgators of the doctrine are of the highest type in-

tellectually, the effect of the theory is a confusion of the spheres of contemplation and action, and a denial of responsible activity through a negation of the will's primacy. We see such effects in the modern world where the evasion of responsibility is a commonplace reality.

There is a similarity between the Socratic position of a "determinism of the will by the intellect," and the Pharisaic teaching of a "determinism of the will by the law." Knowledge of the law, coupled with the necessary response of the will to the law, justifies man. And, if knowledge of the law and observance of the law as that knowledge dictates is all, then there is a type of determinism emerging here, even in the religion of the chosen people.

But the difficulty is, and this is the point of transition to predestination, that a knowledge of the good or of the law does not guarantee a doing of the good or a keeping of the law. The Socratic position defies man's experience and it took the Greek tragedians in the dramatic arts to bring to shame the noble rationalism of the philosophers, as it took the Cross of Jesus Christ to humble and destroy the "sham" righteousness of the Pharisees.

Man is a creature who wills to sin despite his knowledge of the good or of the law. St. Paul's confession is a true one: The evil which I would not do, that I do. The fact that man willingly sins and is free to do so establishes the contrast between the philosophic determinism of the Greeks and what the Christian means by the doctrine of predestination. In philosophic determinism the intellect is primary and the will is its obedient servant. In the Christian doctrine the will is primary and the intellect is subordinate to it.

If the above analysis is correct, predestination is the theological expression of the Christian's insistence upon the freedom of the will over against the determinism of the intellect. The meaning of the doctrine must be found within the context of man's freedom, not outside of it, for it must be seen as the presupposition and fulfilment of man's freedom. In Kantian language, the doctrine of predestination is a matter of the practical reason rather than the theoretical reason. It must never be treated in a contemplative way, but always must be approached within the sphere of action.

Predestination signifies man's freedom. A free man has a destiny. In that destiny the freedom of man is fulfilled and not negated. Only the Christian man can have a destiny, since only the Christian philosophy of history allows for an end of time. The Greeks had no end of time, no destiny, but rather an ever recurring cycle of events. The

Christian has a destiny and that very word itself transcends an ethical determinism. Predestination is about the end of man, the destiny of man, and shall be defined in this essay as: *the perfect freedom of man objectified*. In order to discuss matters of ultimate importance, such as the destiny of man, a process of objectification is necessary. This process never does justice to the subject matter of the discussion. It is so easy to equate the subject matter of the discussion with the unfortunate, and yet necessary objectification of it, due to the thought process. This is why predestination is so often identified with a kind of determinism.

Predestination has been defined as: *the perfect freedom of man objectified*. What does this mean? If the perfect freedom of man is the destiny of man, then this implies that at present man is not "perfectly free." This perfect freedom objectified, which is the theological expression of man's destiny, demonstrates that the substance of the doctrine of predestination is God's interest in man's fulfillment of his destiny. Now, is it possible to say that man is free, but not perfectly free, and this his final destiny is "perfect freedom," without negating in any sense what is usually meant by the free will of man? This is the burden of the essay.

Most Christians would agree that what is popularly meant by the freedom of man is his moral freedom, i.e., his ability to choose good or evil, even though he may know that his choice is evil. The presence of alternative action constitutes man's free will; the fact that he has a choice. No man, whether he is Greek or Christian, would desire for man to choose the evil, but always the good. Socrates' desire was so great in this direction that he denied man freedom to choose knowingly anything but the good. The Christian is more realistic. He would want man to possess the type of will, which would choose only the good, at the same time, insisting that the will is primary.

Yet, the presence of alternative choice, which is the essence of moral freedom, demonstrates a defect in man's freedom. He may choose good or evil; but, the fact that he may, demonstrates that he has an inferior type of freedom. The superior type would be choosing only the good, since the will would be good, and evil would offer no allurements. In this respect the perfect freedom of man would consist in "always choosing the good," not because the good dictates the choice, but because the man himself, who chooses, is that type of person. This seems to answer the aforementioned question. The perfect freedom, thus defined, would not negate man's moral freedom, but

fulfill it. Man is still morally free, but more, since his moral freedom is inferior to the freedom of *being* good.

The question emerges whether or not this "perfect freedom" is obtainable through man's moral freedom. The answer is: No! The fact that man's moral freedom is inferior to this perfect freedom precludes any possibility of attaining the perfect freedom on the part of man *qua* man.

This question occasions the Christian doctrine of grace which is an integral part of the doctrine of predestination. In the history of Christian thought, such theologians as St. Augustine have equated this "perfect freedom" with the grace of God. In a sense the grace of God is the freedom of God. It has always been the Christian affirmation that the perfect freedom of man, denominated eternal life, is a gift of God.

Man's moral freedom is unable to achieve this "perfect freedom." It must come from God Himself. Man cannot achieve perfect freedom because he is a sinner. Yet, the good a man chooses as a free moral agent, is a good given to him already by God. Any choice of good by man is a reflection of the fact that he *ought* always to choose the good, but does not. Thus any choice of good by man is a gift of God. The "ought" emerges because the integrating factor in moral freedom is "the law" (Kant). Only the perfectly free being (God) is without law. Law makes possible man's moral freedom, since it allows choice, but moral freedom *qua* moral freedom is never able to transcend that which makes it possible, namely, the law.

In the Christian faith the law is summed up in love. The "law of love" is *the* commandment of Christianity. The fact that there is a "law of love" precludes any possibility of man's fulfilling that law without the grace of God. Love cannot be commanded and remain love. Yet it is commanded! If man loved because he was commanded to love, the love would be inferior, like his freedom, since he was commanded to do so. At the same time such a commandment would be given in vain, if man had no free choice of will. The paradox emerges! The command gives a choice. But to be able to choose not to love is to love imperfectly. To love perfectly is always to choose to love. Thus the law, which makes possible man's moral freedom, negates man's ability through moral freedom to fulfill it.

The law of love is: *the grace of God objectified*. It is not "the grace of God," but it is what the sinner, who is morally free, takes the grace of God to be. The fact of choice in the law allows for moral freedom,

but if this is so, then perfect freedom can be possessed by man only through the gift of God's grace.

Man's free will is the result of the law of love, which is the grace of God objectified. Man's perfect freedom is the result of God's grace working within the person of man, making it possible for the will of man, not to be integrated by an object (i.e. *the law as the grace of God objectified*), but rather, through love and fellowship with one who is perfectly free. This is the final destiny of man—to be perfectly free with God in a relation of love and fellowship.

The mystery of why some men become perfectly free and others do not has been explained through the doctrine of election. But to go any further than this is to do an injustice to the doctrine of predestination. The fact, that if a man wilfully chooses evil over and over again, this choice will separate him from the perfect freedom of God, is self-evident. In time he may lose even his moral freedom. But this does not preclude that his proper destiny was not in being perfectly free. A "double predestination" is certainly not Christian. The fact that he was morally free is always the reminder that he had a reflection of his destiny even in his choice of evil. The fact, that he negated his destiny as a man, only serves to show that as a man he had a destiny to negate. His final destiny of damnation was only possible because of the potential gift of perfect freedom which he possessed as a morally free man. If his final end is damnation, he is responsible for it, for God will recompense evil for evil and punishment for unrighteousness, just as He will recompense good for evil, grace for unrighteousness, (this is seen in moral freedom itself, which is a good emerging out of man's sin and broken fellowship with God, through the giving of the law), and He will recompense good for good, grace for grace (St. Augustine), which is the perfect freedom of man, and constitutes the final destiny of the "elect."

Philosophic determinism negated the freedom of man and made him a slave to the intellect. In this approach man has no final destiny, for where there is no end of history, there can be no destiny of man. Predestination cannot be equated with determinism because of this defect. Predestination, on the other hand, is the final destiny of man, which fulfills his moral freedom through the gift of God's grace. God's grace makes man perfectly free forever in eternal fellowship with Himself.

The mystery of why some enter that perfect fellowship and some do not is unanswerable, for the mind of man can penetrate neither into

the secret counsels of God and ask why, nor into the hidden depths of the human heart and find an answer. This is where the Christian must stop his rationalization. If he goes any further, he will end up in a theistic determinism, which is Greek in character, and not Christian. This final question is completely shrouded in mystery, and must remain so.

The Christian's only certainty is that in God his free will is not negated, but perfectly fulfilled, and that in the grace of His Son, he finds his eternal destiny.

JUDGMENT IN ADVENT

Notes on Isaiah 8:5-15 and 7:14

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In the American Prayer Book Lectionary most of the Old Testament lessons for Advent are from First Isaiah. A note of judgment by God upon his chosen people is prominent in these selections. Presumably this is in keeping with the penitential nature of Advent; but the average preacher who desires to remain faithful to patterned liturgical themes of the Church Year finds it difficult to effect an emphasis upon penitence during the pre-Christmas season. Advent has become obscured by festive anticipations of Christmas. Moreover, the present day accent upon the positive in religious life, the avid preference for major rather than for minor chords in popular religious thought, and the current "cult of reassurance" make the traditional Advent preaching, that "He shall come again to judge," difficult if not almost irrelevant.

In the writer's opinion this obscuring of the great theme of judgment while making for greater peace of mind in Christian circles has tended toward softness in religion and weakness in theology. It is hoped that the revisers of the Lectionary will not unconsciously yield in any way to the present soft-mindedness and will retain the strong Isaiah readings. The Lectionary will not of course check the trend.

¹Cf. Paul Hutchinson's article in *Life Magazine*, "Have We a 'New' Religion?" April 11, 1955.

Much more needs to be done not only in preaching but also in an honest facing up to some implications of Old Testament scholarship.

One of the possibilities which we shall have to face is that St. Matthew (1:23) made a mistake in his use of Isaiah 7:14 as a promise of the Messiah. I do not refer to the disputed translation of the Hebrew word *'almah* by the words "young woman" (R. S. V.) instead of the word "virgin." The mistake which the early Christian community probably made in this passage is rather in the messianic interpretation which it gave to the word *Immanuel*. "Behold, a young woman (or virgin) shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his name *Immanuel*." *Immanuel* (or Emmanuel) has come to mean in Christian theology something very wonderful—"God-with-us"—in short, the Incarnation. But I am sure that Isaiah meant to say to Ahaz something quite different from the traditional interpretation, and this I intend to show by an examination of Isaiah's thought with regard to judgment in the oracles which contain the *Immanuel* passages.

These passages are in chapters seven and eight. I believe that an attentive reading of these chapters in either the A. V. or the R. S. V. would convince the open-minded reader that to interpret *Immanuel* as "God-with-us" in the sense of grace is at best disjunctive, if not out of context. The "wholeness" represented by these oracles speaks of judgment, not grace. *Immanuel* in the sense of promised salvation does not appear to be supported either by the text or by the context. But first it is necessary to find what Isaiah was trying to say.

The eighth century prophets made significant advances in theology. This is a commonplace understanding among Biblical scholars. How they came to think and preach as they did will always be an interesting question. To find a satisfactory answer out of a study, however thorough, of their "situation" will never be possible, for we are confronted here with the workings of the Holy Spirit "who spake by the prophets." Nevertheless we can discern something about the religious notions which prevailed in their day and learn how and wherein the prophets parted company with these notions.

Three short oracles of the prophet (Isaiah 8:5-8; 9 and 10; 11-15) have been selected to illuminate one doctrine that he preached, apparently contrary to prevailing belief, namely that God is in *all* that happens. This "all" included the evil as well as the good, that is, evil in the sense of woe or misfortune. Amos had said much the same thing about Yahweh (cf. Amos 3:3-6) in his "cause and effect" oracle, ending with the words: "Is there woe in the city and Yahweh not do

it?" That Yahweh was the cause of the woeful events of Isaiah's day probably very few people believed.

The city of Jerusalem faced a threatening "alliance" (*qesher*—the Hebrew word is not too clear)² between the military forces of Syria and Israel. But Isaiah looked farther into the future and more discerningly into the international situation and saw that the great threat was Assyrian imperialism. And Isaiah was interested in a more ultimate question: Who or what is *behind* such portended disaster? In the mind of Isaiah this was a basic theological question. His answer represented a daring leap of thought of real significance to Biblical theology.

The first oracle, Isaiah 8:5-8, is spoken to show that God will move in judgment upon his people through historical (political) events.

And again Yahweh spoke to me.

"Because this people has refused the quiet flowing waters of Shiloah

And rejoice in (admire?) Rezin and the son of Ramaliah

Therefore behold! Adonai is bringing upon them the waters of the River, strong and many

The King of Assyria and all his might

It will flow in Judah, flooding and overflowing

It will be neck-deep

And its outstretching wings will fill the breadth of your land.

Immanuel."

A power trusting group of leaders in Judah were impressed by the show of force from Israel and Syria. They should have been quiet and trusting in God's care. (The figure for this divine providence is "the quiet flowing waters of Shiloah"). They will be overcome by a ravaging flood; *and it will be Yahweh-Adonai's doing*. The word *Immanuel* at the end of this oracle is so disjunctive, if it means "God-with-us" in the sense of divine help, that it may be regarded as an addition by a pious scribe; perhaps by one of Isaiah's disciples. If this is the case then it can only mean something like "Lord have mercy upon us, for we are undone." The note of woe in this case would be clear. On the other hand *Immanuel* may mean simply "God-with-us" in *judgment!* In either case it is scarcely possible to regard *Immanuel* in this passage as *promise* of salvation from disaster.

²G. R. Driver's translation of *qesher* as "difficulty" while doubtless sound philologically does not do justice to the quasi-magical nature of the behaviour of the political leaders, as will be seen below. Cf. Driver's article in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol vi, part 1, April, 1955, p. 82f.

Following is the short middle oracle, verses 9 and 10.

Be herded you peoples and be dismayed
 Give ear, all from distant places of the earth
 Gird yourselves and be dismayed
 Gird yourselves and be dismayed³
 Take counsel together and it will come to naught
 Speak a word but it will not stand (be established) that God
 is with us (*Immanuel*, in the sense of divine providence)

This short oracle may have been added to the foregoing one, although it is quite consistent with it. Its consistency may be explained if it was added by Isaiah himself somewhat later, or by his disciples. In verse 16 we read, "Bind up the testimony, seal the teaching among my disciples." This may suggest some editorial work by Isaiah and his disciples, and the inclusion of the short oracle in the authentic teachings of the prophet. The writer is disposed at this point to follow the traditio-historical method of Eduard Nielsen,⁶ taking vv. 5-8 to be the matrix oracle, with vv. 9-10 added as a development of the central thought.

Isaiah is mocking the efforts of the leaders of Judah to assemble enough power from anywhere to extricate themselves from a bad situation. Their orientation is a power orientation—"power politics", we might call it. They are impressed by power and seek to manipulate it to their own ends. There are certain "magical" overtones in this effort to manipulate power which goes outside the realm of power politics as we understand it today.⁶ (Attention is called to fact that both "power" and "God" are at times represented by the same Hebrew word—*El*)

The question we must ask at this point is, did the portended evil have its source in an *Evil One*? Was Yahweh only the god of Good,

³The repetition is not in the Dead Sea scroll.

⁶Cf. Kochler-Baumgartner, *Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros*, for use of *ki* (that) to introduce a content clause.

⁶*Oral Tradition*, SCM Press Ltd. London, 1954.

⁶Richard Mohr in his *Die Christliche Ethik im Lichte der Ethnologie* has distinguished between two basic orientations which are found in primitive peoples. "The point of departure is the same for religion and magic, namely the experience of misfortune and the relativity of all human importance. However, the reaction to this experience is different. In the religious attitude man reacts to his misfortune with humble self-examination and with seeking for help from an Absolute; in the case of the magical attitude he reacts with the attempt to increase the powers which he finds in himself in order to overcome the misfortune by his own efforts." p. 10. Published by Max Hueber, Munich, 1954.

while some other god was the god of Evil? There is little to suggest that even among Isaiah's hearers there was any such dualistic notion. Dualism seems not to have been congenial to the Hebrew world-view in this period. Perhaps we have the prophets themselves to thank for this. However, dualism was latent in Canaanite thought, as the Ras Shamra tablets indicate. Alien Baal and Mot, gods in the Canaanite pantheon, represented good and evil events or realities—Life and Death—with which (or with whom) in the spring and fall, respectively, the cult devotees identified themselves. But this much seems to be fairly certain: there was no well developed dualism in Isaiah's day which would derive evil events from an Evil One.

Whence then the evil? If it was not from an organized kingdom or realm with a satan of some sort at its head, what was its source? We are free, it seems, to infer that the people generally supposed that it arose from a loosely organized realm of demonic forces. Certainly there is ample evidence for popular animism and fetishism in the Old Testament, practices which presuppose the demonic realm. Out of such an unsystematized realm of evil specific *loci* or *foci* of taboo danger developed. It was not systematic. Chaos, rather than order or system, would have characterized it. Indeed we may say that evil has to become a theological problem, a real question, before any systematic theological statement can be made about it—even a dualistic one. The difference between Isaiah and those whom he opposed was simply that the prophet was doing some serious thinking on a real problem while they were not.

In Isaiah 8:14 we have five interesting objects which seem to have been regarded as specific *loci* of evil force: a sanctuary, a stumbling stone, a plague stone, a snare and a trap. At least one of these, the sanctuary (*miqdash*)⁷ was a cult object. Some of the others may have had cultic or magical significance. In Isaiah's thought Yahweh himself is the ultimate source of misfortune to the nation, and the prophet appears to use these five figures as ideograms to characterize Yahweh's "alien" activity. In the popular mind these objects were regarded with superstition; but they did not represent evil in any systematic sense. What we have here is probably a carry-over from an earlier stage of primitive thought, a stage postulated by students of religious origins, denominated by the term, *animatism*. Animatism represents a notion of impersonal force, good or evil, depending upon cultus

⁷*Miqdash* is from the Hebrew root *qdsh*, a tri-literal which often represents the idea of taboo danger. In this passage a suggested translation would be "taboo place."

operations or magic. These five objects probably had taboo power, sources of evil to the average person who was unable to avoid dangers arising from them.

In the third oracle the prophet effects a transition from historical and political events to magical or cultic figures. As we have seen, the attitude of the leaders even with respect to their political troubles was a quasi-magical one. They trusted in themselves and in their ability to manipulate power. But they were also superstitious. The prophet utilizes their superstitions to try to show that it is *Yahweh* who will bring worse misfortune, and judgment, upon them.

For thus Yahweh spoke to me; by the hand firmly (he took me) and prevented me from walking in the way of this people.

"Do not call an alliance (*qesher*) what this people calls an alliance And fear not what they fear; neither dread.

Yahweh Sevaoth, Him shall you hallow (*taqdishu*)

He is your fear; He is your dread.

He is a taboo-place (*miqdash*), a plague stone and a stumbling stone to the two houses of Israel;

A trap and a snare to the inhabitants of Jerusalem.

And many shall stumble thereon and fall, and be broken and be taken."⁴ (Isaiah 8:11-15)

What a strange list of evil-or trouble-bringing objects by which to describe the nature and activity of Yahweh! Isaiah's language did not afford him many abstract terms, so he employs familiar and inimical objects as idiograms to portray an attribute of Yahweh—the power to bring misfortune. Yahweh-Adonai was trusted by the people to bring success and prosperity. But Yahweh as the author of woe meant—and this is the daring theological assertion—that He was in *all* that happens.

This is the great unifying thought of the prophet. It constitutes a leap of faith, a belief in the Divine Omnipotence. It is a more difficult intellectual position to take than any form of dualism. It certainly demands more of faith than that confident assurance so characteristic of our own day—which attributes the good to God, but seems to derive trouble and misfortune from an amorphous realm of the not-yet-known or not-yet-controlled factors in our existence.

Martin Luther chose to take the more difficult intellectual position. He wrestled with this same problem. He concluded that God engages in

⁴G. S. Driver, op. cit., would change the Hebrew text making *taqdishu* into *taqshiru*, and *miqdash*, into *miqshir*. The Dead Sea scroll, however, validates the received Hebrew text.

alien work to bring men to judgment. In Isaiah 28 Luther saw evidence of "Christ's strange work"—the "*opus alienum dei*."

The important question raised by Isaiah is thus a theological one. It involves the reign of God over all. The question is: Is God somehow *in* all that happens— political, natural—and in one's personal life? in the evil as well as in the good? This is not to suggest that God is both evil and good. To one who regards God as Thou, the Wholly Other, the Living God there are "moments" in this confrontation of both love and fear. (The latter moment is not to be lightly dismissed as subjectivism.) He cannot be convinced that the inner event of holy fear is devoid of any sufficient cause in the nature and work of God. Luther goes so far as to ascribe such events, inward (holy fear) and outward (woeful phenomena), to the wrath of God. Emil Brunner, while not specifying any outward happenings to the wrath of God does speak clearly about the alien work of God, an activity distinct from *agape*. "There is a two-fold realm of God, the realm where God is as he reveals himself in Jesus Christ as salvation, light and life; and the realm where he is not as so revealed in Jesus Christ, namely in anger which destroys, annihilates and works in darkness."⁹ This is not dualism. If the words "Jesus Christ" were left out of this statement of Brunner's, it would be perfectly understandable to Isaiah. However, Isaiah would point to specific events, present and to come, and even to the taboo objects instanced above, to demonstrate God's work of alienation.

The Immanuel Passages

As Isaiah's burden in these oracles is to teach that misfortune comes from God, the Immanuel passages, if they refer to the promise of divine grace, seem to be much out of context. In the second oracle (vv. 9-10) there is a possibility that the leaders of Judah were thinking that Yahwah was with them as a weal-bringer: or simply as power (*El*). If this is the case then the translation given above, "It will not stand (be established) that God is with us," is the opposite conviction of the prophet or his followers. The thinking of the leaders is all wrong; they are mistaken in thinking that God is with them. It is an instance of (quasi-magical?) over-confidence.

There are only three *Immanuel* passages in the Old Testament, Isaiah 8:8, 8:10 and 7:14. We now turn to a consideration of the last one,

⁹Gordon Rupp, *The Righteousness of God: Luther Studies*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1953 pp. 146, 206, 218, 254.

¹⁰*Die Christliche Lehre von Gott: Dogmatik Band I*, Zwingli-Verlag, Zurich, 1953, p. 245.

the much disputed "a virgin shall conceive" passage. This is the passage quoted by St. Matthew as referring to Our Lord. But to regard Isaiah 7:14 as a promise of the Advent of Our Lord is very doubtful. Many biblical scholars have realized this. The passage comes right in the midst of accounts of Isaiah's children, who receive names that are texts or short titles of his woeful prophecies—Shear-yashub ("a remnant shall return" Isaiah 7:3) and Maher-shalal-hash-baz ("the spoil speeds, the prey hastes" Isaiah 8:1-3). The first child's name did not spell out a pretty prospect, for this text refers to a time of troubles. The latter name is clearly a prophesy of disaster. *Immanuel* of 7:14, another name given to a child, is also in the context of promised troubles. In early childhood he will eat curds and wild honey; and from 7:21-25 we can see that a diet of curds and wild honey certainly does not signalize a time of material prosperity, but rather that the country has been laid waste and is only fit for pasturage. And it does appear in 7:18-19 that the "Assyrian bees" will provide this honey. In the light of these considerations this *Immanuel* passage seems to forebode judgment rather than to promise a saviour. The trouble will come when this child is quite young: "He shall eat curds and honey when he knows to refuse evil and to choose good" (7:15). The disaster to the country will already have happened when he has attained this age: "For before the lad shall know to refuse evil and to choose good, the land which you loathe shall be deserted by both her kings" (7:16).

While there may be some doubt as to the writer's correctness in his interpretation of *Immanuel* in Isaiah 8:10 the context certainly does not permit a prophetic promise, or pious hope, that destruction will be avoided. Isaiah 8:8 is puzzling, but a messianic interpretation would be strained. Isaiah 7:14, if read only in the English versions in the wider context of these oracles, appears to signalize judgment rather than the promise of the Saviour.

Let us admit, however, that judgment is a strange theme to our Anglican congregations. There are, to be sure, those god-fearing few for whom it has reality. It is not within the purpose of this paper to suggest how the note or "moment" of judgment may be awakened in the great majority. All that is herein undertaken is to establish the theological reality of the theme of judgment in a portion of the Advent readings and to correct the misconception that *Immanuel*, "God-with-us" should necessarily be a sign of God's grace. Indeed, God may be with us in judgment.

BOOK REVIEWS

The History and Character of Calvinism. By John T. McNeill. New York, Oxford University Press, 1954. x-466 pp. \$6.00.

Professor McNeill has produced an admirable work on a subject which is now being treated with respect among us, after a generation when there were few defenders of Calvin in the English-speaking world, but only his Catholic or Liberal critics. Approached *con amore*, the story of the Swiss Reformation is an exciting one. In Part I Zwingli comes into his own, along with a number of other leaders even less well-known to most readers (including Zwingli's successor Bullinger, whose *Decades* were for a while a standard homiletic resource in the Church of England). Part II, occupying about a third of the book, is in effect a brief account of Calvin's life and thought; beautifully balanced, scholarly in content yet popular in style, this should be for a long time the standard introduction to Calvin in English. The section closes with a fine sketch of Calvin's character and influence, and interesting speculation as to what a *Calvinus redivivus* might be today—

a learned, energetic, prophetic, at times splenetic, yet cautious leader of world Protestantism, with a leading role in the ecumenical revival and in Christian thought and learning. (p. 234).

Part III deals with "The Spread of Reformed Protestantism in Europe and Early America", into the eighteenth century; Part IV with later history and present contacts under the title "Calvinism and Modern Issues." These chapters give a broad picture of the spread of Reformed Christianity. I find parts of the later chapters least satisfactory in that the effort to say something about everybody means that not very much is said about anybody; moreover the author is obviously less naturally at home with modern Continental developments than with Scottish and American. There are a few ragged edges left in putting together so much material—thus from a sentence which tells us that

The division occasioned by conditions of the Civil War in 1861 led to the union of the Southern branch of the New School Presbyterians with the Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States to form the Presbyterian Church in the United States (p. 377)

one might infer that the division was one in the Old School, the Southern branch of which after the end of the War changed Confederate in its title to United, but the point is not entirely made clear. More surprisingly, we are told that James VI planned to restore episcopacy in Scotland, but not that he actually did so (p. 306); in fact the next Scottish event mentioned is the reaction provoked by the attempt to introduce the Prayer Book in 1637.

The specialist in Calvin studies and related topics will find a number of interesting suggestions—I note for instance the discussion of Calvin's ordination, which McNeill argues that he may well have received from the pastors at Geneva, in spite of the absence of any formal record of the event (pp. 136-7)—though was he perhaps thinking of himself and other Reformers when he argued that in times of need God could still raise up a prophet or an evangelist (*Institutes* Book IV, iii, 4)? There are a number of interesting sidelights in the much-discussed question of the relation of Calvinist Christianity and the spirit of capitalism, an always fascinating topic. For the general reader of Church History, here is an important story well told, and we whose own tradition is not that of the Reformed Religion technically so-called may welcome this excellent presentation of its history. If Calvin does, when all is said and done, seem to miss the full message of, for instance, John 3:16, yet we may appreciate the witness to the divine majesty of one of whom it may truly be said that "A reverent awe of God breathes through all his work." (p. 209).

E. R. HARDY

A History of the Crusades. By Steven Runciman. Vol. I *The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.* Vol. II *The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East 1100-1187.* Vol. III *The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades.* Cambridge: University Press, 1951-2-4, 3 vols. boxed \$6.00-\$7.50-\$6.50.

With charming modesty, Steven Runciman begins his *History of the Crusades* by regretting that the large collective work on the subject planned in the United States was not available in time for his use, adding that "It may seem unwise for one British pen to compete with the massed typewriters of the United States" (vol. i, p. xii). But while the American work is still expected, Runciman has completed his task with a success shown by the demand already met for reissues of the first two volumes. The whole series now appears in an attractively designed box.

The subject has not before been treated on this scale in English, yet

even in three volumes some specialization is necessary. Runciman is primarily interested in the Crusades as what on the face of it they primarily were, a military and political enterprise. As such he carries the narrative through carefully and attractively, from the long prelude to the First Crusade through the fall of Acre in 1291, with an Epilogue on later crusading efforts to the death of Pius II, last pontiff to attempt to take the idea seriously, in 1464. The second volume is perhaps a little less successful than the others—there is a natural unity in the account of rise and fall, while the attempt to describe every campaign of every Frankish principality in the Kingdom of Jerusalem makes for a certain confusion. Even more interesting are the chapters on various aspects of life in what mediaeval Europe knew as "Outremer"—political and social life in vol. II, culture, commerce, and art in vol. III. The latter are accompanied by an admirable series of plates of castles, churches (including the Holy Sepulchre as it was before modern rebuildings), and mss. illuminations. The author's sympathies are broad, though it must be added that he seems more at home with knights than with ecclesiastics, and unsympathetic to merchants with their persistent habit of making money.

A final summary is sombre, even a bit plaintive. "Seen in the perspective of history the whole Crusading movement was a vast fiasco. . . high ideals were besmirched by cruelty and greed . . . and the Holy War itself was nothing more than a long act of intolerance in the name of God, which is the sin against the Holy Ghost" (vol. III, pp. 469, 480). Runciman naturally deplores especially the perversion of the Fourth Crusade. For the moral judgments there is certainly much to be said; but I wonder if the judgment of historic ineffectiveness isn't due to looking at the Crusades and the crusading states too much in isolation. They are part of a larger whole, the first stage in the expansion of Western Europe, and the one great effort of mediaeval Christendom to act as the unit it was supposed to be. The failure of the militant soldiers of the Cross led directly into the spiritual warfare of the 13th-century friars, the founders of modern missions and exploration. The loss of the Latin foothold in Palestine was followed promptly by the rise of national loyalty and enthusiasm—it is symbolic that the last important English crusader, Edward I, was also the first really national English king. After the fall of Acre events move rapidly to the fall of the mediaeval Church and its re-forming into modern Christianity. Both in politics and religion the energies roused by the Crusades turned naturally into new channels—all these events pursued

by the ambiguity of history, but certainly significant. These comments are not, of course, strictly a discussion of Runciman's work, but rather a suggestion that the fascinating story which he follows with such loving care and presents so magnificently is perhaps even more important than, modest at the end as at the beginning of his work, he considers it to have been.

E. R. HARDY

Early Christian Interpretations of History. By R. L. P. Milburn. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954, pp. 221. \$3.00.

These Bampton Lectures, delivered by Chaplain Milburn of Worcester College, Oxford in 1952, present a lively treatment of the presently popular subject of historiography in the presently popular area of Patristic studies.

The first and last chapters deal with the problems of methodology in the writing of history: what is the historian's task, and whether it shall be the more appropriately fulfilled through the medium of realism or that of symbolism. In both lectures, after discussing the perennial problems of perspective, selection, and interpretation, the author is disposed to resolve the diverse points of view by taking recourse to the field of artistic representation. In the introductory chapter he concludes that the historian may be most closely compared with the portrait-painter for he shares with the artist both the gift of vision and the discipline of technical competence. And again, in the final chapter there is an appeal to "the power of feeling to colour fact" found in pictorial art as appropriate also to the writing of history where "selection and stress" are essential to "a clearer understanding."

It would appear that Mr. Milburn believes that Christian historiography should make good use of symbolism, endeavoring to present the meanings of life as set forth in the events of life, whereas Greek historiography, with all its demand of eye witness testimony, ends up in allegory, for it presupposed that the events of life were too bare and too poor to exhibit in themselves the meanings of life.

The weakness of these chapters is also for the most part the basis of their value. They are a skillfully constructed mosaic of choice quotations. A casual leafing through the first chapter alone turns up over seventy gems from an impressive list of authors from Herodotus to Aldous Huxley. Mr. Milburn himself supplies very little critical comment, preferring to avoid any judgments that cannot be aptly expressed in a line or two from an English poet. It may be that he has

cut his discussion of historiography to suit the figures whose work he has chosen to study. Certainly they all appear at their best in this portrait of the Fathers as historians.

The lectures on Eusebius (iv) and "God's Judgment in History: Augustin, Orosius, and Salvian" (v) are the best in the series, evidencing an admirable knowledge of the texts and commentaries. The earlier chapters dealing with the second century Apologists (ii) and Origen (iii) are chiefly concerned with the interpretation of Scripture. In both, pertinent passages relating to the writing of history have been overlooked, e.g. Irenaeus' doctrine of the progress of man and the condescension of God, and Origen's detailed discussion of heuristics and methodics in the *Contra Celsum*.

"The treatment of History in Early Christian Art" (vi) and "Apocryphal Stories" (vii) reveal the author's special interest but, though related and informative, seem peripheral to his main theme.

From the standpoint of the historian, and certainly also of the theologian, the appendix which recounts the historical background of the doctrine of the assumption of Mary is of great interest. The doctrine, of course, furnishes a notable instance of the development of tradition, and its study constitutes a significant contribution to the understanding of the history of religious thought. Mr. Milburn throws light upon the etiology, growth, and authority of tradition, tracing the history of the myth from its rise in pious romance (pagan and Jewish as well as Christian) through the several stages of elaboration to its promulgation as doctrine and its elevation to essential dogma.

Mr. Milburn writes well, exceedingly well in places, and he writes out of a wide and appreciative acquaintance with the wisdom of the historians of antiquity and the perspectives and insights of the nineteenth century. His mood is that of the wise and understanding judge rather than that of the case-pleading attorney.

NOAH EDWARD FEHL

Principles and Problems of Biblical Translation. Some Reformation Controversies and their Background. By W. Schwarz. With a Foreword by C. H. Dodd. Cambridge University Press, 1955, pp. xiv 225. \$4.75.

The difficulties which a translator has to contend with are generally well-known. They were known to the translator of *Ecclesiasticus* in the second century B. C. "These things", he wrote in his preface, "said originally in Hebrew have not equal force when they are trans-

ferred into another tongue." The translator must expect a double portion of criticism: of Pope's translation of Homer, Bentley said, "It is a pretty poem, but must not be called Homer."

The translator of the Bible has to meet the problems of every translator. Should it be word for word, like Aquila's translation of the Old Testament, or should it give the sense and even adapt the sense to later conditions, like Zwingli's pleasant translation of a line from the Twenty-third Psalm: "He maketh me to lie down in an Alpine meadow"? (Zwingli was a Swiss patriot!) Indeed, the Bible translator has to face problems and perils unknown to the translator of an ordinary book. Bible phrases have become a part of their religion to many, and they are shocked to find them altered. This is one of the objections Augustine made to Jerome's translation of the Old Testament: 'Jonah was comfortably settled under a *cucurbita* (gourd)—why place him in the new version under a *hedera* (vine)?' Augustine also tells of a bishop who was forced to denounce the new translation, fearing that otherwise he would be left without a congregation. This is the peril from the man in the pew.

In the sixteenth century the Bible translator was attacked from another quarter. Jerome's Vulgate was the authorised version of the Western Church; not only so, scholastic theology was erected on a foundation of words from the Vulgate—change the words and the building might develop cracks. This was the danger as seen from the chairs of theological professors—medieval ones, of course! Furthermore, a translation of the New Testament from Greek was considered heretical: who could be sure that the wily Greeks had not corrupted the Greek text? It should be noted in connexion with this last objection that Pope Leo the tenth was favorable to Greek studies and to translations of the Bible from Greek.

Dr. Schwarz, using an impressive array of first-hand sources, presents three views of Bible translation as current in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. First, the Traditionalist view, which was static and took Jerome's Vulgate as the final form of the Bible and the scholastic method as proper for interpretation. The traditionalist today would take the King James version as final, and employ the most literal interpretation. The story is told of an Anglican priest in Canada in Colonial days who was often met on his travels through his district by itinerant preachers who would enter into theological disputes with an armory of texts from the A. V. The Anglican would respond by saying, "You appeal to the word of God: we must be sure what that

word is. Let us look at it in its original form." Then taking a Greek Testament from his pocket he would offer it to his disputant and ask him to read the text under discussion. This always ended the argument. The Anglican of this story would be on the side of Dr. Schwarz's second group, the Philologists, the humanists of the Reformation period who maintained that interpretation depends on a knowledge of Hebrew and Greek. For the advocacy of Hebrew, Dr. Schwarz has a chapter on Reuchlin; for the advocacy of Greek, a long chapter on Erasmus, occupying a third of the book. Here it is shown that Erasmus was temperamentally a conservative whose studies and friends, especially Colet, made him a reformer, one who thought learning and ridicule are better weapons than bluster and abuse. It might be added that Erasmus' cautious attitude was also political in the better sense of the word: he was a good European and wished the unity of the Western world to be preserved at almost any cost. Luther, on the other hand, was a good German.

Dr. Schwarz's last chapter deals with Luther as representing the Inspirational theory of translation. Luther's theology was dominated by his interpretation of Romans 1:17, an interpretation which he called his *illuminatio* and applied to the whole Bible. The category Inspirational is also used in the present volume of the Alexandrian version of the Old Testament, called the Septuagint from the well known story of the seventy-two elders who worked in separate cells and then found that they had produced identical translations—a miracle indeed! This yarn might better be called Philonic than classed under Inspirational; for Philo was mainly responsible for it and it suits his literally one-sided view of inspiration. It is different from Luther's experience, as Dr. Schwarz himself points out. Luther's illumination came after study and thought, much as a scientist sometimes solves a problem quite suddenly after working on it for perhaps many months. Augustine accepted Philo's cell theory of the Septuagint; Jerome, who knew Hebrew and Greek, knew that if the Septuagint is an inspired translation, so much the worse for inspiration.

Dr. Schwarz's book deals with the principles of various Bible translators of long ago, and does not indulge in polemics. For this reason his book is all the more valuable in these modern times of new translations, each with its own virtues and its own defects.

It is an interesting and perhaps significant fact that of the three renowned translators, Latin was Jerome's native tongue, Erasmus and Luther learned Latin at school and Erasmus used it as a native

tongue, whereas none of the three learned Greek or Hebrew until what we would call their school and college days were over.

A. HAIRE FORSTER

The Eucharistic Words of Jesus. By D. Dr. Joachim Jeremias, translated from the second German edition by Arnold Ehrhardt. Macmillan, 1955, pp. xi + 195. \$3.75.

It has been taken for granted for a number of years past that the Last Supper was not a Passover meal, and that the Fourth Gospel is correct in its dating. Prof. Jeremias first challenged this assumption in the first edition of his *Abendmahlworte Jesu*, which appeared in 1935. For various reasons this book did not receive the attention among British and American scholars it deserved. The second edition, 1949, and an article by him in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (Vol. L, Jan.-Apr., 1949), which gave some of the main points of his thesis, prepared the way for the able translation of the second edition.

This second edition has had the benefit of fourteen years of continuous study, so that it is in many ways a new book. As the author says in his introduction, "Numerous questions have been re-examined; the liturgical character of the texts has been taken far more seriously than in the first edition; the problem of literary criticism has demanded more serious consideration (chapter two is completely new); the contribution of astronomy to the chronological problem had to be discussed; and in particular there have arisen a number of questions about the exegesis of the text . . . In various respects I have had to reconsider my views." On the other hand the conclusions are the same.

The main point is an attempt to prove that the Last Supper was a paschal meal. Once this is established a number of other matters are taken up in the light of that conclusion. Prof. Jeremias begins by showing that there is no way in which the account of the Synoptics and that of John can be made to harmonize; one or the other must be accepted. He then presents a number of points "previously neglected, but which permit a definite conclusion whether or not the Last Supper was a Passover" (p. 14). This conclusion supports the author's thesis. The Supper could not have been a "*Kiddush* meal", "since the term is of modern invention", and "never existed if anything more is meant . . . than meals at which the normal grace was combined with a special blessing on account of the Sabbath or a feast-day starting during the meal or as the meal began" (p. 23). As to the theory of Dom Gregory

Dix and others that the Supper was a "*chaburah* meal" he says "... here too there has been an *ad hoc* conjecture of a custom for the existence of which evidence is totally lacking" (p. 25).

Following the "positive evidence", the various objections are taken up and refuted. Taken singly each point appears quite convincing and builds up into a very impressive argument, but the question still arises as to why the Fourth Gospel deliberately disagrees with the Synoptic dating. It is well enough to say that the Church had come to think of our Lord as the true Paschal Lamb, and that "It was possibly the popularity and vividness of this comparison which—perhaps all unconsciously—affected the recollection of the events of the Passion and caused them to be antedated by twenty-four hours in that part of the tradition to which the Gospels of John and Peter belong" (pp. 56f), but this seems too easy. If the belief that the Last Supper was a Pass-over meal had been firmly fixed in the tradition, it is strange that John, or the source which he followed, would have gone directly contrary to it.

From this fixed point of the Supper as a paschal meal, Prof. Jeremias proceeds to examine the words of Institution, and comes to the conclusion that literary criticism establishes their early date (p. 71). In his treatment of the question of the omission of the institution of the Eucharist from the Fourth Gospel he seems to this reader to be too dogmatic when he says, "... the opinion that John did not connect the institution of the Eucharist with the Last Supper, but with the feeding of five thousand, is too artificial to be convincing. Besides, John 6.51c-58 does not originally belong to the discourse on the bread of life, but comes from a pre-Johannine eucharistic homily. All difficulties disappear, however, when it is realized that the author of the Fourth Gospel consciously omitted the account of the Last Supper because he did not want to disclose the sacred formula to the heathen" (p. 73). This last point is discussed at length and has much to commend it; but there is no reason why it cannot be combined with the belief that the whole of the sixth chapter of John is meant to be interpreted in the light of the Eucharist.

An exhaustive study of Lk 22:19b-20 leads to the conclusion that the section is not Luke's own work, but a liturgical formula, "a 'third variation' on the liturgical formula of the Eucharist, a variation showing an advance on Mark and Paul" (p. 103), and a part of Luke's original text. The "shorter version" arose from a desire to keep the Eucharist from profanation by the heathen. The theory that the shorter text of

Luke presupposes a Eucharist with the sequence wine-bread is impossible, "for there never has been such a Eucharist" (p. 104).

A comparison of the texts shows that the earliest forms of the Words of Institution is identical with that of Mark (p. 115). The Marcan text and the Pauline are independent of each other, and do not derive from a common Greek source, but go back to a common eucharistic tradition, which was in Aramaic (p. 127). Paul received his at Antioch "where he had settled about A.D. 40 (Acts 11.26)" (p. 131). Mark's wording is "earlier than the development and enlargement of the Aramaic original of the account of the Last Supper, which took place long before A.D. 49/50, the results of which are to be found in Paul.

The final chapter deals with the interpretation of the Words of the Eucharist. It is full of suggestive and interesting material. It is said that the Supper is primarily a "fellowship of life", admission to which is open to all, and which "Jesus meant (as) an offer of salvation to the guilty sinners, and the assurance of forgiveness" (p. 136). From the time of Peter's Confession every meal with Jesus was a symbol, a pre-presentation, indeed an actual anticipation of the eschatological meal . . . a table fellowship of the redeemed community with the redeemer" (pp. 136ff), culminating in the final Passover with the Twelve. "Jesus speaks of Himself as the paschal lamb. This sets out a comparison between Jesus and the paschal lamb, but does not identify them" (p. 145), an acted parable which not only sets forth the truth but provides participation in it. Thus the members of the fellowship share in the atoning power of Jesus' death.

The phrase, usually translated, "in remembrance of me", found only in Paul and the longer text of Luke, "although it has not yet been found in any of the Hellenistic formulae, is very common in Palestinian usage" (p. 161). Prof. Jeremias thinks it should be translated "that God may remember me"; its meaning is purely eschatological, that is, "God remembers the Messiah by bringing about His Kingdom in the parousia" (p. 163). That the words do not appear in the earliest form of the account of the Last Supper is not sufficient reason to regard them as unhistorical, "for the command to repeat the rite did not necessarily form part of the liturgical formula, since the celebration itself was its fulfilment" . . . In any case Jesus said more at the Last Supper than the few words which have been preserved in the ancient liturgical formulae" (p. 159).

At the end of the book there are seven closely packed pages of references to books and articles, divided into three groups on the

basis of whether their authors believed, disbelieved, or were uncertain that the Last Supper was a Passover meal. There is also an extensive index of Biblical quotations and a very brief "General Index", which might profitably have been expanded.

This is a tremendously important book. Doubtless few readers will agree with every point, and some may continue to doubt the primary thesis, but it is a book which must be taken account of in any further study of the subject.

E. J. Cook

A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine. Edited by Roy W. Battenhouse. Oxford, 1955. pp. xiii + 425. \$5.50.

This work on the life and writings of St. Augustine is issued on the occasion of the sixteen hundredth anniversary of the birth of St. Augustine. Sixteen authors contribute chapters to the work. Divided into three parts, the first deals with the significance of Augustine for today, a splendid survey of the life of Augustine, and a chapter on Augustine as pastor. Part two comprises seven chapters, each dealing with a major theme of Augustine's Major Works: the Early Writings, On Christian Instruction, the Anti-Manichean Writings, the Anti-Donatist Writings, the Anti-Pelagian Writings, the Trinity, and the City of God. Part three deals with special facets of Augustine's thought—Faith and Reason, Creation, Christ, the Christian Ethics, and the Devotional Life. The book is the product of a small theological group called the Duodecim, which has met semi-annually for a dozen or more years in the East.

All through the book there runs the common conviction that Augustine has a message of utmost importance, not only for his own age, but for our own, and that his deep and piercing spiritual insights have much to teach us, faced as we are with a breakdown of culture and civilization in many ways comparable to that in which Augustine lived. The writings of Augustine are so voluminous that a guide is certainly needed, and this book is written to offer that guidance to a direct study of those writings.

It is most significant that in the whole book only two very brief references have been made to the extensive treatment by Nygren on the religious motifs that meet in Augustine. The insights of Nygren are too important not to merit more attention from these various authors, either as positive or negative criticisms. Especially is this so in the treatment of the Christian Ethic and in the chapter on the

Devotional Life. Paul Ramsey's book *Basic Christian Ethics* would be a good reply in way of criticism on Augustine's ethical teaching.

To this reviewer Edward Hardy's chapter on *The City of God* is one of the outstanding contributions to the volume, and should be a 'must' for any who are attempting to read that massive work of Augustine. Also the editor's chapter on the Life of Augustine gives an excellent framework in which to understand the other chapters. It is vivid and living and makes Augustine real for us today.

Each chapter has at its end a good bibliography, representing the quotations used in the text. The book may well be the handbook for any attempt to read Augustine's writings, giving one a general summary view and thus preparing one to read the primary writings slowly and critically. It is hoped that the reading of this book will stimulate and encourage not only clergy but also serious and intelligent laity to serious study in Augustine.

The reviewer misses any major attempt to evaluate and criticize the extent of the NeoPlatonic strain in the life and writings of Augustine, too important an element not to be treated by a special chapter.

CHARLES FRANCIS WHISTON

Rufinus: A Commentary on the Apostles' Creed. Translated by J. N. D. Kelly, D. D. Ancient Christian Writers, No. 20 Newman Press, 1955, pp. 166. \$2.75.

This present volume is a notable addition to the Ancient Christian Writers series. The translator is principal of St. Edmund's Hall, Oxford, and is a well-known Anglican priest. His masterly study published several years ago, *Early Christian Creeds*, has earned him an outstanding position as an expert on credal history.

Rufinus' *Commentary* is a brief, non-technical explanation of the Creed, intended for the use of catechumens. Its extraordinary historical interest is based on three factors. First it is a major witness to the early texts of the Apostles' Creed. Rufinus is primarily concerned with the local version used in his native city Aquileia, but he calls attention to the slightly differing phraseology of the Old Roman Creed, and of the typical Greek Creeds of the period.

Secondly, the *Commentary* is an important witness to the development of the Biblical Canon, and to the tradition of the latin text. Rufinus enumerates the canonical books, and also distinguishes a group of edifying but non-canonical works, much as in our 39 Articles. The *Commentary* is heavily weighted with biblical quotations all from

the *Vetus latina* version. In his notes, Dr. Kelly compares each of these with Vulgate parallels, and where relevant, with the Hebrew or Greek version. The observance of Roman Catholic conventions regarding titles, authorship, etc., makes several footnotes rather misleading.

Thirdly, there is the importance of Rufinus' actual exegesis of the various clauses of the Creed. Through this brief work Rufinus introduced into the Latin Church a number of interpretations and illustrations derived from the Greek Fathers, particularly from St. Cyril's *Catechetical Lectures*. All of this information is likewise carefully discussed and documented in the footnotes of this volume. Rufinus' *Commentary* was extremely influential in the following generations, and his teaching was unknowingly relayed from one author through the early medieval period.

The brief introduction to this volume is admirable, and the footnotes at the end are very extensive. Dr. Kelly has not only provided factual and historical comments quite sufficient to make this book usable for the "ordinary" reader, but has also provided a tremendous range of critical and technical information for the specialized scholar. His extensive bibliographical references to treatises in Continental journals should be particularly helpful to English and American students.

In past generations, the critical and historical study of the Creeds held a notable place in Anglican scholarship—it is sufficient to mention such writers as Archbishop Ussher, F. J. A. Hort, H. B. Swete, and A. E. Burn. We may be very grateful to Dr. Kelly for reopening this important field of study. Such a revival is timely. In view of the recent interest in Christian Initiation, it is especially important that theologians become more aware of the crucial place held by the Creed in the ancient rites of Catechesis, Baptism, and Confirmation.

H. BOONE PORTER, JR.

Saint Dunstan of Canterbury: a Study of Monastic Reform in the Tenth Century. By Eleanor Shipley Duckett. W. W. Norton and Company Inc., 1955, pp. xi + 249. \$4.00.

Many readers will have read and appreciated Dr. Duckett's previous books on medieval history, including her studies in the early days of the English Church. This life of Saint Dunstan, and the picture of his times which she has given us, carry on the series; from *Anglo-*

Saxon Saints and Scholars and *Alcuin, Friend of Charlemagne*, we come now into the tenth century, during most of whose course Saint Dunstan lived and flourished.

The main interest of the man and his times is suggested by the subtitle: "a study of monastic reform"; for this was the time when, through the Benedictine monastic tradition, the Church tried to take up once more the ordered life which Northmen and Magyars had shattered. Saint Dunstan's early association with Glastonbury is described, as well as his relationship to monastic reform on the continent. A later chapter gives a detailed account of the monastic life which *Regularis Concordia* provided, and which owes a great deal of its substance and spirit to Dunstan and his colleagues.

Saint Dunstan also belongs to that numerous group of administrator bishops, closely associated as he was with the affairs of Church and State in England during King Edgar's reign, 957-975, and influential during the succeeding reigns of Edgar's sons. The account of Edgar's coronation service which Dunstan drew up recalls a similar event of 1953 descended from it liturgically as well as politically.

As a thorough and detailed account of an important bridge period in English Church history, Dr. Duckett's study is useful; her emphasis lies, however, on the background and the conditions of the time, and Dunstan as a person seldom stands out on his own.

SAMUEL M. GARRETT

(Ed. note: Oxford Univ. Press published a new edition of the *Regularis Concordia* by Thomas Symons, in 1953)

Religious Liberalism in Eighteenth Century England. By R. N. Stromberg. Oxford, 1954, pp. xi + 174.

"Religion, after all, is the serious business of the human race," writes Arnold Toynbee, and Paul Tillich points out that between 1670 and 1830 religion "ceased to offer an unquestioned sense of direction and relevance to human living."

Beginning his introduction with these two quotations, Professor Stromberg sets forth on his quest to determine how and why eighteenth century England moved through religious disputes to religious apathy, as its culture became progressively secularized. The topic is a large one for a work of this size: an exciting subject and one highly relevant to our own times, for the patterns of science and rational inquiry and critical investigation of text which emerged in the eighteenth century

are clearly similar to those by which religious claims are most strenuously tested in the West today.

The author shows the confident way in which Christian apologists welcomed science as a friend and invited rational investigation of their faith. Authoritarianism had had its day, and a new freedom of the press was available to dissent and criticism of the established religion. But the Watchmaker God of Deism challenged the personal God of the Bible; the disappearance of a sense of sin (let alone original sin) undercut the role of Christ as Redeemer; and in large sections of the country religion became progressively a kind of ethical prop for the *status quo*.

The apologetic technique of building the Christian case on miracle and fulfillment of prophecy brought rebuke from those whose God was too reasonable to tinker unpredictably with His machine, and whose Christ could hardly be said to have fulfilled *all* the prophecies. The absence of a developmental sense of history made the Deists snobbish of the Old Testament and the Jewish race as pretty poor stuff. Since enthusiasm was taboo, few were revolutionary enough (as in France) to want a new religion or a new church; and the end scene of the war of attrition was an unconstructive, spiritually unattractive Deism *vis à vis* an internally confused, devitalized, however "respectable", church.

A notable historic by-product of the theological and devotional failure of nerve was the secularization of politics and a blindness to the need of social reform. However much English deism may have affected the revolutionary temper of France and America, "the English deists were neither reformers nor democrats." Religion became compartmentalized, no longer the driving force of history and culture.

Professor Stromberg accomplishes much in a short volume. His book gives us more than the title promises, for in addition to the specifically religious debate we are thrown into the midst of political and economic history. His analysis of the predicament of eighteenth-century English Christianity, and his concluding warnings to neo-orthodoxy not to forget the importance of reason in the battle against scientism and secularism are incisive. Throughout, the temper of his scholarship is fair and untendentious. An unevenness exists between the carefully documented chapters on the Deist controversy and the breezy historical surveys of politics, the ruling class, and social reform at the end. But this is a minor criticism of a work that should

do much to clarify the issues and outcome of the great eighteenth century "liberal vs. orthodox" debate, and point its relevance to our own time.

RICHARD H. WILMER, JR.

Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution. By William Haller. Columbia, 1955, pp. xv + 358.

The publication of Professor Haller's newest book is an occasion for rejoicing. In 1938 his distinguished *The Rise of Puritanism* appeared, and since that time he has been working on this volume, which continues the account of English Puritanism from 1638 to "the climax of the revolutionary movement in 1649".

In this book we study the explosive ideas and events of the most revolutionary twelve years in English history. The author's purpose is not "to rehearse again the story of the struggle between the King and parliament or of the accompanying controversy over church government", although much of the history of both, particularly the latter, is laid before us. The essential purpose is "to present the history of the discussion which ensued when in November, 1640, all restraints on pulpit and press came suddenly to an end and preachers found themselves free as they had never been before to expound the Word in confident expectation that the long-awaited reformation of the English church was at last to be accomplished and that reformation in England would lead to the reformation of the church through the world and so to the final redemption of mankind."

The leaders of the reforming movement consisted of four main groupings. First was the central core of ministers, rigidly Presbyterian in their outlook, led by the *Smectymnuus* faction, who seized their fast day opportunities to preach to Parliament and tell the members to execute their God-given responsibility by reproducing in England the "holy discipline" of Geneva and Scotland, and who dominated the Westminster Assembly at the outset. Next, there was Parliament itself, originally as Presbyterian-minded as the divines, and who at first thought their only problem would be the defeat of King and prelacy, yet who found themselves fighting a second-front action against the left-wingers of radical Independency. Thirdly came the army, particularly as it passed under the increasing control of Cromwell, a fascinating body of brave men and religious fanatics, the New Model as much in devotional fervor as efficiency in the field, and ever moving to challenge a confused Parliament for the rule of the country.

Finally, there was the rank and file of England outside the royalist camp, whose emotional, literary, and religious capital was London. If the divines and the Parliament were originally allied on the Presbyterian front, the army and the general populace spoke for extreme liberalism, democracy, and religious independence. This popular element was not a mob; Charles I was never lynched. It had a growing literacy and sophistication, to which the pamphleteering of Milton and the Leveller John Lilburne particularly ministered in expounding the issues of democracy vs. tyranny.

With profound scholarship and understanding of the period, Dr. Haller traces out the rise and eventual victory of Independency over the earlier Presbyterian form of Puritanism. Free discussion in the Westminster Assembly, the Parliament, the press, the army and the people led to more and more disagreement as to the form which the reforming movement should take in church and state. Baillie of Scotland stood by, shrewd and helpless, to document with mordant clarity the confusion of the Assembly and the victorious emergence of the Independents. Parliament hardly knew which way to turn, but by 1646 the preachers they were hearing on the fast days were the Independents. Roger Williams, Richard Overton, John Goodwin and William Walwyn, as well as Milton and Lilburne were in the front line of the publicity artillerists, firing off all kinds of revolutionary ideas: religious tolerance, freedom of the press and all forms of religious and political association, economic, political and social equality.

Milton, of course, is in a class by himself, though Dr. Haller's designation of him as "the secular humanist" is misfitting, particularly in the light of what the term's special meaning is today. From his anti-prelatical tracts and the radical attack on the marriage law to the monumental *Areopagitica* for freedom of printing to the *Tenure of Kings*, which justified the execution of Charles, the poet stands alone as intellectual leader of his age. Not as much in the public eye as Lilburne, perhaps not even as influential as a popular radical writer, Milton bestrides his age with his theory of social contract, his learning, devotion and courage, and his brilliant literary gifts. Dr. Haller rightly calls him "a kind of herald and prototype of that oncoming fourth estate of publicists of all sorts, poets, and pamphleteers, journalists and men of letters, with whom governments in future would have to reckon. His pamphlets, their influence sustained and enhanced by the poems which grew out of his revolutionary experience, would become one of

the main channels by which Puritan revolutionary ideas in their most dynamic form would reach the age of John Locke."

Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution is a first-rate book. This enormously complicated period, with its involved currents and cross-currents of thought and action, reversals of position and changing tempers, is carefully analyzed and worked through in terms of its leading ideas and their exponents, without any attempt at glib simplification, under the sure hand of a careful scholar who knows where to lead his reader. His method tends to produce a book with many recapitulations. This is repetitious and aesthetically artless, but at least we always know our chronology and geography and take no false turns on the trip. The same tendency to recapitulate, when it turns up at the level of critical summary, works to absolute advantage throughout the book, leaving no need for an "author's conclusion" kind of chapter. His final paragraph is worth quoting:

"But the question in 1649 was how to reconcile the judgment and conscience of John Lilburne and the judgment and conscience of Oliver Cromwell. The only way by which Lilburne and his party could keep up their contention for what they believed to be their constitutional rights was by open rebellion against the only power left in the state to enforce any kind of order at all. And the only way Cromwell could think of to put an end to war and anarchy was by repressing the self-appointed champions of liberty and constitutional rights as mutineers and traitors. The truth was that liberty was not itself the solution of the problems it brought to men's apprehension and perhaps created but only the condition which made progress toward solution possible. It was not salvation but only the hope of salvation still to come. Men learned by being free that the world was all before them. 'Many there be,' Milton wrote in *Areopagitica*, 'that complain of divine Providence for suffering Adam to transgresse, foolish tongues! When God gave him reason, he gave him freedom to choose, for reason is but choosing.' "

RICHARD H. WILMER, JR.

The Religious Bodies of America. By F. E. Mayer. Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 1954, pp. xii 587.

Books classifying and describing the manifold ecclesiastical organizations and bodies of the United States of America are in constant demand and appear frequently. The present one, by the professor of

systematic theology at the Missouri Synod Lutheran Church's Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, is distinguished for its encyclopaedic coverage of the subject and for its doctrinal approach to the American denominations. While the academic discipline of comparative symbolics has largely disappeared from American theological schools, the ecumenical concern of the XX Century has again recognized the importance of Faith and Order as distinguishing marks of a broken Christendom without playing down the former element. The intent of Professor Mayer's big book to describe our American religious groups by their creeds is altogether commendable.

However, the execution of his task must be challenged at several significant points. The classification is often arbitrary and at points fantastic. Adherents of Judaism may well be shocked to find themselves lumped together with Unitarians, Universalists, Swedenborgians, Christadelphians and the American Ethical Union as "Anthropocentric and Anti-Trinitarian Bodies"; while some of Liberal Judaism may welcome their Mayer-designated brethren, an obvious injustice has been done to traditional Jews. Similarly, many Methodists and members of the Evangelical United Brethren will be restless in the company of "Arminian Bodies" with the Salvation Army and "The Holiness Bodies."

The author is inclined at many points to desert his task of description to crack and rasp the knuckles of those whom he takes to be departing from the Divine Truth as revealed to the Missouri Synod. For example, "The one basic weakness of the National Council (NCCCUSA) . . . is the lack of theological correctness, manifesting itself in an extreme form of unionism and in the apparent understanding of Christ's kingdom in terms which seem to match the objectives of the United Nations." Nice polemic, but misleading information! Anglicans have their inning by being chastized for latitudinarianism as "a major unifying principle among" them, and are warned forthwith that "The Christian religion is a religion of convictions, not of compromises. Christian charity does not dissimulate, temporize, or compromise."

The book is sprinkled with errors. The Jamestown congregation of Anglicans is mentioned as having been established two years later than it was. The organization of the Episcopal Church after the Revolution is described without mention of the 1789 General Convention. The bibliographies exhibit startling omissions as well as erroneous citations.

As a book demonstrating the points at which other communions,

denominations, sects and organizations rankle the Missouri Synod Lutherans, the book is unsurpassed. For a modern survey of the American religious bodies, we will have to continue, despite its weakness on the credal side, with Frank S. Mead's less ambitious *Handbook of Denominations in the United States* (New York: Abingdon, 1952)—which, incidentally, Professor Mayer lists in his general bibliography, inaccurately.

WILLIAM A. CLEBSCH

Making Sense out of Life. By Charles Duell Kean. The Westminster Press. pp. xi-156. \$2.50.

"This book is the result of fifteen years of pastoral experience," says the author, who is at present the Rector of the Church of the Epiphany, Washington, D. C., and the experiential approach is evident in the multitude of practical illustrations he gives from his efforts "to help adult men and women to make sense out of their lives in spite of the fact that daily living seemed so often meaningless." "In many cases these people had been exposed to the Christian tradition, but very rarely did they see any connection between the religious symbols passed on to them and the problems with which they were confronted."

His thesis is that Christianity makes sense out of life because it goes to the heart of man's principal problem, which is his lack of understanding of the meaning of life itself. Man's chief desires are for security, status, and achievement. "The satisfaction of these drives is the essence of the religious appetite." Man's chief worries are death ("the threat of the future") and guilt ("the threat of the past"). In interpreting the former the author says, "In actual life, 'little deaths' raise more serious threats to meaningfulness than physical decease." As to the latter, he writes, "No person can honestly survey his own past activities and relationships with unmingled satisfaction. All men are aware that they have failed to do justice to the opportunities and associations they have had."

The function of religion is to provide a vitalizing interpretation of life's meaning and to offer solutions to the problems of "death" and "guilt". In showing how Christianity fulfills this task the author is generally clear and forceful. However, there are times when he is not easy to understand. For instance, "The Ascension is the symbol that relates the Christian affirmation of life's meaningfulness to the whole world of human thought." Or, "The Ascension is the dramatic way in which the Christian faith affirms that the cross and resurrection are

expressions of reality itself." Moreover, it is not clear why the author feels that the "Ascension" should be capitalized and "cross" and "resurrection" should not be; but this is his usual way.

There are statements the accuracy of which one is inclined to question. For example, "What happened to Jesus is not as important as what happens to those who take the cross into their hearts." Or, "That Jesus foresaw the resurrection in anything like the way the Christian Church understands it is to be doubted."

However, these are minor points in comparison to the many helpful ways in which he shows how Christianity helps us in "making sense out of life". His Biblical quotations, particularly from St. Paul, are strikingly helpful, and he shows breadth of knowledge and skill in selection.

Some final quotations may perhaps give evidence of the quality of the author's thought and presentation:

"Faith is that combination of understanding and confidence upon which a person acts when he must make real decisions. The free act, religiously speaking, is that which a man is enabled to make because he has come to grips adequately with the problems of death and guilt. All religions are really attempts to combine faith and freedom for living men and women because only such a combination endows life with undeniable meaningfulness."

"The resurrection faith consists of continuing to live gladly and gloriously in this world of problems sustained by the presence of the living Christ here and now."

WALTER H. GRAY

The Second Book of Maccabees. Translated by Sidney Tedesche. Introduction and Commentary by Solomon Zeitlin. Harper, 1955, pp. 271. \$4.00.

The Anglican Communion, following Jerome, holds that the books of the Apocrypha are important for instruction in life and manners but that no doctrine necessary to salvation is to be proved by them. The Roman Catholic Church regards them as fully canonical. Protestants in modern times generally ignore them.

Rabbinic Judaism denounced these books in the first century of the Christian era. Only recently has Jewish scholarship turned to them once more. Now Dropsie College in Philadelphia is preparing a series of commentaries on the apocryphal books which, in the words of Dr. Abraham A. Neuman, "is inspired by a resolve to redirect this litera-

ture, which was cut off from its source in Judaism, to its original spiritual habitat in Jewish thought."

This volume on Second Maccabees, fourth in the series, is a worthy companion to its predecessors. It is a painstaking work of scholarship that in many particulars departs radically from the usually held views about the book.

Professor Zeitlin, in his introduction, gives a rich account of the historical background of the period between the return of Ezra (which he dates in 458 B.C.) and the Maccabean wars. To Christian readers this may be the most useful portion of the book for it deals with a passage of time about which very little is known. He follows this with a discussion of the authorship of the book which he attributes to an "Epitomist" who elaborated an earlier work of Jason of Cyrene.

Christian scholarship frequently takes the position that Second Maccabees is a Pharisaic reply, in the first century B.C., to the Sadducean bias of First Maccabees. This is challenged by Zeitlin. He argues that the book was written in Antioch in 42 A.D. and that it was called forth by the demand of Caligula that divine honors be paid to himself.

This critical situation evoked memories of a time when Antiochus Epiphanes similarly sought to force Israel to idolatry, and a pious Jew of Antioch "shaped up" Jason's narrative with the rhetorical flourishes that passed for literary composition at the time.

Zeitlin stresses the fact that the Epitomist believed in a resurrection of the body and the soul. He also argues that the Pharisees did not believe in a bodily resurrection, this on the basis of a statement in Josephus' *Jewish War* that the Pharisees maintained that "every soul is imperishable."

Supposing the book to be an Antiochene product of the first century A.D., Zeitlin insists that Second Maccabees largely influenced the nascent Christian movement. He thinks that St. Paul drew his doctrine of a bodily resurrection from the work in question, and he advances a theory that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews was writing to Hebrews in Antioch who were themselves familiar with Second Maccabees.

"The Second Book of Maccabees . . . reveals the enormous influence that the Jews of the Diaspora, particularly the Antiochean Jews, had on early Christianity. We may say with assurance that though Christianity had its general origin in Judaea, its development stemmed from its first roots in Antioch. The Second Book of Maccabees gives us a better perspective and a clearer understanding of the tendencies of emergent Christianity."

ROBERT O. KEVIN

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

Devotional Dialogues from St. John's Gospel. Ed. by Frederick A. Schilling. Berkeley, Calif.: The Author, 1952, pp. 69. \$1.00.

Behind this little book, which is intended for liturgical use by minister, lay reader and congregation, is a theory of the origin of the gospel. Dr. Schilling believes that the gospel is not only dramatic and liturgical in character, but that it actually had its origin in "liturgical exercises with responses and confessions of faith" (p. 7). The idea is interesting but it is impossible to assess it until the author sets forth his theories more fully, as he promises to do in another publication. Nothing quite like it is known in the worship of the early Church, though it is probable that in Hellenistic churches at the end of the first century there must have been great creativity and variety.

Dr. Schilling's immediate purpose is to make the gospel available to congregations for a use that is neither the ordinary "responsive reading" nor the lesson. The nearest analogy is the reading of the Passion in Holy Week by various persons. Rubrical directions, prayers and suggestions for use are supplied. A good example is 1:35-51, which is divided between minister, congregation and two readers. At the end of the book there are notes on each section and a short list of books for further study.

The Passion of the King. By Frederick C. Grant. New York: Macmillan, 1955 pp. iv + 107. \$2.50.

These are addresses for Palm Sunday, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday (the seven words from the Cross), and Easter Day. They have the quality and flavor that we expect from Dr. Grant: a firm historical footing, a rich knowledge of

theology, literature and art, the spirit of prayer, and deep concern for the world which God has made. One note that runs through the book is faith in the purpose of God: Christ's life is what humanity is intended to be and is the true Incarnation of God (p. 10); what we call "realized eschatology" was Jesus' view—God's triumph has begun (p. 16); ordinary people can transform their own sufferings and so exert a strength not their own (p. 29); the loud cry uttered by Christ on the Cross was a shout of triumph (pp. 66 f.); the genuine goodness of men like Chaplains Shannon and Schwer cannot go for nothing (p. 105). This is a book to strengthen the steadfast and to renew the Christian faith of the wavering.

The Moral Foundation of Democracy. By J. H. Hallowell. University of Chicago Press, 1954, pp. 132. \$3.50

Professor Hallowell's lectures on the Walgreen Foundation at Chicago are an earnest and on the whole an effective attack upon the positivist tendency in political science and more especially in the current discussions about the validity and future of democracy. "Our democratic institutions require a philosophy of life to sustain them," the author says about half-way through the book (p. 67). Pareto, Thurman Arnold, T. V. Smith are cited as evidence of the inadequacy of much contemporary discussion, and the case is mightily persuasive. One is less impressed with Professor Hallowell's positive and constructive work in providing democracy's "philosophy of life." "Not only must we recover the belief in man as a unique being whose reason is a reflection of the image of God, but we must also recover our belief in the existence of universally valid principles in

terms of which we can guide our individual and social life toward the perfection of that which is distinctively human" (p. 85). Although Reinhold Niebuhr is quoted on several occasions, Hall'owell nowhere makes any effort to answer the questions he has raised about the natural law (cf. "The perennial mistake of rationalists, whether Stoic, Catholic or modern, is to exempt reason from either finiteness or sin or both and to derive universal rational norms from this confidence in reason." *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, (I, p. 284). The criticisms of Thurman Arnold, for example, as to the validity of reason are met only by a vigorous re-assertion of reason's capacities (p. 23), and Christianity is equated with the proposition that the defect in man is not so much "his incapacity to know the good as in his unwillingness to act upon it when known," (p. 102). A more profound understanding of the Christian tradition on the matter of sin would have enabled Professor Hall'owell to see the important truths which are represented in the works of his positivist enemies, and his own reconstruction would have achieved greater preciseness and relevance.

J. M. K.

The New Being. By Paul Tillich. Scribners, 1955, pp. 179. \$2.75.

The new university professor of religion at Harvard, from 1933 to 1955 professor of philosophical theology at Union Seminary in New York, gives us herewith another volume of sermons, continuing the theme and developing the views found in *The Shaking of the Foundations*, that great book of some years back.

The present series of sermons, all of them preached at Union Seminary or at Connecticut College for Women, are concerned to show that in "Jesus accepted as the Christ" we have been given the

revelation of "the new Being," which is to say, the focal instance in which manhood is completely "transparent" to God and hence in which a new level and principle of life is introduced into our midst.

It is impossible in a brief note to do justice to the depth of human insight, the width of knowledge, and the height of spiritual discernment, which the reader will discover in these sermons. For this reviewer, who tries in his own Anglican way to be a "disciple" of Tillich, the book is pure gold; and he is sure that many others will find in it a new, penetrating, and deeply moving presentation of the central Christian claim: that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself."

W. N. P.

The Nature of Christian Worship. By J. Alan Kay. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954, pp. 115. \$2.50.

This is a small and very compact treatment of a vast subject; and one tends to compare it with such treatises as those of Evelyn Underhill, D. H. Hislop, or A. G. Hebert, and to contrast its conciseness with their more extended and complex presentation. What Dr. Kay has given us is a clear and simple outline or sketch of the nature of Christian worship, whose topics are illustrated by a selection of texts from Scripture, the classic liturgies, and such writers as those mentioned above.

The subject matter is beautifully organized into four main sections: the elements of Christian worship, corporateness and individualism in worship, symbols as the means of worship, and the Holy Communion, which is "not different from" other forms of worship: "rather in it they are summed up and perfected." Certain sections stand out as especially clear and arresting: the description of four classic worship forms, the Eastern Litur-

gy, the Roman Mass, the Free Church preaching service, and the Free Church prayer meeting; the frequent reference to Wesleyan hymnody; and a discussion of the Covenant relationship between God and His people.

This book lends itself particularly well to use in a parish study group, or as an answer to someone who asks for something "simple" to read on the subject of worship. What one misses, of course, is the fuller discussion which is needed at times, for example, in regard to the doctrine of the Real Presence, or the Eucharistic *amnesia*. Dr. Kay writes from the standpoint of the English Protestant tradition, and yet he tries to give full appreciation to earlier traditions of Christian worship. His limited compass, however, limits also the extent of such appreciation: there is a tendency to emphasize the "personal and subjective" in contrast to the objective and formal, and it is the opposition of these elements which at times takes the upper hand in his presentation.

R. M. G.

Scripture and Tradition, edited by F. W. Dillistone. Seabury Press, 1955. pp. 150. \$3.00.

This little but important book is intended to present an alternative to the widely held view that "Scripture itself is the result of tradition," and that the Bible reflects "the religious history and spiritual insights of a community." G. W. H. Lampe shows that for the early patristic period the apostolic tradition was embodied in Scripture; ecclesiastical tradition was "explication and interpretation of the Scriptural data." F. J. Taylor traces the Anglican view of the primacy of scripture, interpreted in the light of reason and tradition. R. R. Williams points out the challenges to this position in the nineteenth century, especially in German biblical criticism. And D. E. W.

Harris tries to solve the problem by speaking of "the apostolic testimony uniquely enshrined in Holy Scripture, made living in each generation by the Work of the Holy Spirit, but only truly made living in a Church which like her Lord is identified with the world in its achievements and its tragedy, its growing insights into truth and its powerlessness and perplexity."

These authors would, I think, be the first to admit that they have reached no final solution. They are asking some crucial questions. But is the answer to be found in an historical analysis? Should not more "scientific precision" be employed in dealing with the semantically "loaded" words revelation, inspiration, authority, scripture, and tradition? In what sense can the content of the Bible be regarded as "data"? In what sense is the return to scripture in the Reformation analogous to the birth of modern science?

R. M. G.

Épîtres de St. Jean: Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire, by J. Bonseriven. 2d ed. rev. ("Verbum Salutis" IX) Paris, Beauchesne, 1954. pp. 280.

L'Evangile et les Evangiles, by J. Huby. 2d ed. rev. by X. Léon-Dufour, ("Verbum Salutis" XI). Paris, Beauchesne, 1954. pp. 304.

The Roman Catholic commentary published under the general title of "Verbum Salutis" is intended for the general reader, rather than the specialist, but is done by highly competent scholars and is on about the same level as our own Moffatt and Westminster series. The religious interest is paramount, though the writing is not of a devotional character; in Father Huby's work on the Gospels, there is a persistent tone of apologetic against classical Protestantism and against every variety of radical criticism.

The new edition of Huby's work has retained the chapters of introduction to

the several gospels as he wrote them twenty-five years ago, with the bibliography brought up to date. The opening chapter, on "The Gospel before the Gospels," has been entirely rewritten by Father Léon-Dufour in the light of the sociological and form-critical studies of the intervening period. The conclusions generally are ultra-conservative and it cannot be said that the great problems are faced in all their essential difficulty. Certainly the new light is shed on the interpretation of the Gospels.

Father B. Nirvén's book on the Johannean epistles, on the other hand, is for all its small compass a contribution of exceptional value. His discussion of the theology of the epistles, especially in the long section on "The Sons of God: the Christian Life," is as penetrating and profound as it is beautifully written; and the exegesis is uniformly admirable. The commentator has entered into the very spirit of his author and has unfolded the richness of his thought with sympathy and discernment.

F. W. B.

Erniedrigung und Erhöhung bei Jesus und seinen Nachfolgern. By Eduard Schweizer. Zwingli-Verlag, 1955. pp. 167. Sw. fr. 15.50.

This investigation (number 28 of the *Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments*) takes its start from the idea that the modern situation in which the Gospel is preached is like that of the Hellenistic churches, concerned with "Weltangst" and the meaning of existence, not like that of the early Palestinian community (or that of Luther's time) with its consciousness of sin. What then did the Gospel say to this situation? Schweizer deals first with the meaning of discipleship for the earliest followers of Jesus, then with what this meant for them in terms of the obedience of Jesus and his exaltation (as he observes, this was not only "for them", but, for them, "with him"). Next

he discusses their interpretations of this meaning in relation to the various titles given him, and finally shows how, in the new Hellenistic environment, these understandings were reinterpreted. Whenever emphasis was laid not on following the way of Jesus but on one's own achievement, Hellenistic popular moral philosophy or Jewish legalism entered in (p. 144). Schweizer's book contains many worthwhile insights, but it would have been strengthened by more of an analysis of "Weltangst" and "Existenz" in the ancient world and more of an attempt to correlate event with environment in terms meaningful today.

R. M. G.

A Good and a Bad Government according to the New Testament. By Jean Héring. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1954, pp. 68. \$2.75.

The thesis of this monograph is that a good government (according to the New Testament) is one, whether Christian or not, that maintains justice. The use of force to that end is legitimate as well as necessary; the definition of justice is not treated as a difficulty, the substantial agreement of ancient law codes with the Decalogue being mentioned; and it is maintained that the concern of the state is with actions only.

A bad government is that which punishes the innocent, and arrogates absolute power over all areas of life (including the definition of good and evil) to itself. Government may never interfere with the preaching of the Word, instruction in justice, freedom of conscience; nor is it ever justified in engaging in religious persecution.

Projecting the lines of thought in certain passages (Ro 13, *et al.*), Héring arrives at the conclusion that a super-national government equipped with force for the maintenance of justice, specifically

the enforcement of agreements, is in line with New Testament thought.

The author is a professor on the Protestant faculty at Strasbourg; his best-known work is probably *Le royaume de Dieu selon Jesus et l'apôtre Paul* (1938)

H. G.

The New Testament in Cadenced Form. Designed by Morton C. Bradley, Jr. Cambridge: the Bradley Press (distributed by Rinehart & Co. New York), 1954. pp. 675. \$5.00.

This book is (the second to be) set on the photographic type-composing machine, Phot.n. A cadence is defined by Mr. Bradley simply as the natural unit within the sentence. Each cadence is printed on a separate line (thus, "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God" is on one line, "and him only shalt thou serve" on a second). There is further division indicated by spacing between sentences, paragraphs and sections. Dialogue is indented. Old Testament quotation indented and italicized. These devices do make for ease of reading, and are well adapted to the rhythmic prose of the King James Version, as well as to the rhythmic form of much of Jesus' teaching and the diatribe form employed by St. Paul.

The volume is beautifully set-up and printed—clear type on fine, opaque smooth paper.

H. G.

John Carroll of Baltimore. Founder of the American Catholic Hierarchy. By Annabelle M. Melville. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955. pp. ix + 338. \$4.50.

One who has just read this book is tempted to ask himself how many Protestant Americans know any more about John Carroll than his name, if that. Those who are familiar with our Revolutionary history will remember his surname, and will remember also the large and public-spirited Roman Catholic family of Maryland who caused that name to be enrolled

in the company of the Founding Fathers. This John Carroll was a cousin of the Charles Carroll who signed the Declaration of Independence, and a brother of the Daniel Carroll who signed the Constitution and served with distinction on various civic projects of the nation's early days.

This book tries to show that John Carroll's story has its place in the Republic's annals as well as in those of the Roman Communion in America. It succeeds with distinction. We learn also of the times and the places in which this first Roman Catholic bishop in the United States lived and worked: his early life in colonial Maryland, his Jesuit training in France and Belgium, his service with Franklin on a diplomatic mission to Canada in the early days of the Revolution. And then we come to the trials and the accomplishments of his years as overseer of the Roman Catholic parishes in a new frontier nation, and the problems he faced in trying to maintain the ties with Rome during the years of the French Revolution and Napoleon's rule.

This is a vivid story, and the author tells it vividly, with careful attention to sources and scholarship. She brings out clearly what surely must have been the two principal aspects of Bishop Carroll's life: his loyalty to his Church and its head; and his equally fervent loyalty to America and its leaders. Of interest to Church historians is the account of Bishop Carroll's relationship to the Society of Jesus, both in America and abroad, during the years of its suppression, 1773-1814.

It is often said in book reviews that such and such a book "fills a gap" in a certain period or field. Dr. Melville's book has done this. While not claiming to be a definitive biography, her labours have brought to our attention an important and attractive person and leader in Church and Nation.

S. M.G.

Inside Buchmanism by Geoffrey Williamson. Philosophical Library, 1955. pp. 226. \$4.75.

One of the most significant religious movements of the past 30 years has been known in its various phases as "A First Century Christian Fellowship," "The Oxford Groups" and "Moral Rearmament." The overall term is "Buchmanism". An experienced British journalist investigated it, attending one of its "World Assemblies" at Caux in Switzerland (where it owns and operates a large resort hotel) and its English headquarters in London (where it owns several contiguous houses). He read a good deal of its very considerable literature, attended its travelling musical show, "The Good Road," talked with various students of its "College of the Good Road." This book is a chronicle of his observations and of his judgments, including such items as the movement's objectives, changes, finances, values, liabilities, and a biographical sketch of its founder and autocrat, Dr. Frank N. D. Buchman.

Having seen a good deal of Buchman and of his work in my senior year at Princeton, and having written my B. D. thesis in 1924 about him, I know at first hand that the historical sketch of his life, and of his work in the first stage of the movement, is reliable, and I judge the story of the latter phases to be equally so. It is by all odds the best account of this extraordinary phenomenon in contemporary American religion—which the author regards as a composite of a naive form of American evangelical Christianity, American advertising and promotional techniques, moral-political concern. In its first two phases Buchmanism was a strictly religious and Christian movement; in its third phase, its leaders have stressed it chiefly as the strongest ideological opponent of Communism and "godless secularism." Buchman strikes me as the

ablest proponent of a religious cult since Mrs. Eddy. He has what H. A. L. Fisher described as "that hard crust of spiritual arrogance necessary to the leader of a fighting faith." He has exercised a religious autocracy and has developed a spiritual discipline which makes him akin to Ignatius Loyola. He has had a very beneficial influence on many young people throughout the past 35 years, and I still think that the most acute remark ever made about his movement was that attributed to Archbishop Temple 20 or more years ago—"Buchmanism is an excellent thing for a man to have been through."

I think this book should be read by those who are concerned with the contemporary American religious scene.

A. C. Z.

More Letters of Herbert Henson Henson. Chosen and edited by E. F. Bradley. Macmillan, 1954. pp. 161. \$3.00.

The first volume of Henson's letters met such a wide response, and evoked so many requests for more, that Canon Bradley was moved to make this further collection. Most of the letters in the earlier volume were from the writer's later years; most of these are from the period of his Durham episcopate—the time of Henson's greatest vigor, in Bradley's judgment.

Henson has been called a satirist in the line of Dean Swift and a master of the epistolary art, and these letters would bear out that judgment. His independence of judgment, clarity and pungency are well known. Here we get a glimpse of the Bishop as pastor and counsellor, and it is an inspiring picture. He was understanding, direct, firm and clear in a way that makes the reader even now—and must have made the addressees—feel that his own thinking has been clarified and refreshed.

It is a grand collection, wonderfully varied. Every shade of really good humor

is interspersed among wise and careful letters on all sorts of questions private and public, written with a masterful style.

H. G.

A Theological Introduction to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, By E. J. Bicknell, Third Edition revised by H. J. Carpenter. Longmans. 1955. pp. xvii-463. 21/-

This new edition of this standard work by H. J. Carpenter has been awaited for some time and will be warmly welcomed. The list of books for further reading has been supplemented and better arranged. "The text itself has been revised on conservative lines". New emphases in theological thinking and research have been noted. There are a few needed corrections. Some rephrasing of sentences makes often for clearer reading. The book, as revised, will long continue as a standard introduction to Anglican theology.

P. S. K.

Christian Theology—An Ecumenical Approach. By Walter M. Horton, Harper, 1955. pp. xii + 304. \$3.75.

The author deals with such themes as The Knowledge of God, The Nature of God, God and the World, God and Man, Christ the Saviour, The Church and the Means of Grace, The Christian Hope. Each theme is dealt with from a similar perspective. First he deals with the universal religious need of man, then treats of the Christian beliefs which are held in common by the many churches, and thirdly with the unresolved issues between the various denominations. The book is thus a survey book, rather than giving us the author's own particular theological faith. A very good Bibliography is appended, which can serve to introduce the reader to fuller grasp of the various positions held within the churches.

This reviewer would offer this criticism

of the book. It fails to grip the whole man, since it is addressed to the intellect, rather than to the heart and will. It leaves one still uncommitted. One gains the impression that this is a book about theology, rather than a theology professing the author's living faith. In comparing it with Aulen's 'The Faith of the Christian Church' (and one of the main purposes of this book is to correct and replace Aulen's book) one feels that whereas Aulen's book is written from *within* the Christian faith, Horton's book is written from *outside*, and about it, and thus lacks the note of living theology. This book can never claim to supplant Aulen's as a text book in Systematic Theology.

C. W. F.

Christian Doctrine: A One Volume Outline, By John M. Shaw. The Philosophical Library. 1954. pp. 379. \$6.00.

Dr. John M. Shaw, Professor of Systematic Theology in Queens College, Ontario in his one volume outline of Christian Doctrine, has written a book which should be highly suggestive to clergymen and seminary students, and can also be read with profit by thoughtful laymen. The author has avoided technical terms and always clearly shows the relevance of doctrine to the whole of life. There is much to inspire in this book and the appended notes at the close of each chapter furnish excellent suggestions for further study and research.

The book is divided into five parts. I. The Christian Doctrine of God; II. The Christian Doctrine of Man and Sin; III. The Christian Doctrine of Redemption; IV. The Doctrine of the Christian Life, or of Life in the Spirit; V. The Christian Doctrine of Life after Death. Each section is subdivided into four, five, or six chapters. An excellent and comprehensive index is of very great value. Dr. Shaw is both thoroughly conversant with the great works of

the past, and also makes frequent reference to such modern theological thinkers as Tillich, Barth, Brunner, Aulen, Temple etc. Theological problems and "issues" are treated fairly, and credit is always given to those writers with whom he cannot agree. This book is, in every way, an excellent introduction to Christian Doctrine, and will be warmly welcomed.

P. S. K.

Christian Affirmations. By W. Norman Pittenger. Morehouse-Gorham, 1954. pp. 159. \$2.50.

Here is a work in apologetics in the best sense, just because it is the defense of the faith as a positive exposition in modern terms for the modern mind. What we have is a clear and popular account of Anglican Catholicism as related to the modern mind. This is indeed the *via media* of Anglicanism; and Dr. Pittenger does give us the essentials of the historic faith. Here is the Liberal Catholicism for which General Seminary has been famous. It is Catholicism *with the windows open*, yet a Christianity not reduced but enriched by the growth of modern knowledge.

Here we have the religion of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ redeeming the world through his Church. Here we see the Christian life as a sacramental life, with worship finding its meaning in its highest expression, the Eucharist. The Incarnation is seen as a Divine Act and the Incarnation as rooted in the God whom alone we worship. But the Incarnation brings God to us, and in the Eucharist as the Sacrament of his presence we are united to him, and through his presence with us we are redeemed.

This is sound theology and makes clear to the modern mind the relevance of the historic faith to modern problems. The chapters on Prayer and the Nature of Worship are particularly good. The only possible flaw is Dr. Pittenger's failure to

reconcile his social conception of human life with his implied disregard of the necessity of redeeming civilization. Redemption not only of the individual but of society as well. This is the value of the theology of Maurice, Gore and Temple. Yet this is only a secondary matter in a book so excellent in its expression of the Catholic faith for the man of truly open mind.

J. S. M.

Reflections on Life and Religion. By James Baillie. Edited by W. Moberly and O. de Selincourt. George Allen & Unwin, 1952. pp. 288. 16s.

Sir James Baillie was professor of moral philosophy at Aberdeen and later vice-chancellor of the University of Leeds. He translated Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, wrote three works in philosophy and one on religion, and had a full and active career in public life and at Leeds. His *Reflections*, edited from his personal notebooks, bespeak a finely trained mind, a profound interest in religion and understanding of it, and his experience of men and events. The sections on Human Nature and Conduct and on The World and Our Knowledge of It are fascinating for their rich variety held together by the impress of a lively, careful and thoughtful mind. The hundred and forty-three pages on religion are full of thoughtful and penetrating little essays. It is remarkable (or perhaps not so to those who knew Sir James) how frequently he arrives in his own way at some of the key insights of contemporary theology, and how seldom one feels the lack of technical information behind an opinion. The author felt the attraction of the "big generalization" about mankind or religion or Christianity, but seldom gives it rein—and then usually as a concluding tag or opening springboard-sentence.

Students of William Temple would find the book especially interesting. I should judge, for comparisons and perhaps con-

trasts. This is Temple's kind of thinking, but without the movement on towards a 'dialectical realism'.

H. G.

Religions of the Ancient Near East. Sumerian-Akkadian Religious Texts and Ugaritic Epics. Edited with an Introduction by Isaac Mendelsohn. The Liberal Arts Press, 1955, pp. xxix+284. No price mentioned.

The eventual appearance of this book or one closely resembling it has long been assured, in view of a growing general interest in the less familiar varieties of ancient religion. It is gratifying to find that the task has been performed so soon and so competently. Professor Mendelsohn functions in several capacities. He is the author of the excellent introduction, which sets forth, with no superfluous detail, what is known of the Sumerian, Akkadian, and Ugaritic divinities. He is the translator of the section entitled "Akkadian Incantation Texts." He has compiled, for the reader's convenience, a brief list of gods and goddesses, each of them clearly and accurately characterized. The rest of the material consists of selections from Dr. Pritchard's *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, a work both indubitably valuable and undeniably too difficult for ordinary undergraduate use, as the reviewer has had abundant opportunity to observe since its publication in 1950. In Dr. Pritchard's book the prefaces to the individual pieces are often a bit too erudite for general consumption. Professor Mendelsohn wisely simplifies these preliminaries in the present publication. The format, the style, the contents, of Professor Mendelsohn's well executed work qualify it for wide circulation. It will probably be adopted as a textbook in many of our theological seminaries. For this purpose it has no equal in the field.

W. C. K.

Geschichte der Griechischen Religion, I. Die Religion Griechenlands bis auf die Griechische Weltherrschaft. By Martin P. Nilsson. Second, enlarged edition. Munich: Beck, 1955, pp. xxiii + 872 + 52 plates.

The first edition of this great work was reviewed *in extenso* in this journal: Vol. I in A. T. R., Vol. XXX. 64-67, Vol. II in Vol. XXXIV. 11-26. The fourteen years which have followed the appearance of Vol. I (in 1941) have seen its widespread and increasing recognition as the foremost work on its subject in any language. In spite of the war and the impossibility of wide circulation either then or for some years following the conclusion of the war, the work has steadily won world-wide recognition. The new edition is a complete revision, not in major matters but in details, with an almost complete resetting of the type. The new edition is fifty pages longer and there are changes in six of the illustrative plates. The account of "primitive" religion is somewhat changed, due to more recent research, and new sections have been added on the muses and the abstract deities. There are some changes in the sections dealing with the Delphic oracle, Zeus Meilichios, Kronos and the Titans, philosophy, and Bendis. But the main changes and additions are naturally to be found in the footnotes, bringing the work up to date. There are a few important corrections and additions for Vol. II on p. 872.

Although the work deals only with Greek religion, even in the Hellenistic age, and not with the totality of religions which surrounded the early Christian church, this work is indispensable to the student of New Testament and primitive Christianity; for after all is said, it was the Greek religion which contributed most to the formation of the background and was the chief element (next to Judaism) in the preparation of the world for the Gospel.

F. C. G.

Customs and Cultures: Anthropology for Christian Missions. By Eugene A. Nida. Harper, 1954, pp. 306. \$4.00.

The author, who is afflicted with illiteracy, exhausts a vast store of commonplace anecdotes about oddities of primitive religion, proving that for the most part the "savage" is crazy like a fox.

N. E. F.

The Apocrypha: Bridge of the Testaments. By Robert C. Dentan. Seabury Press, 1955, pp. 121. \$2.25.

A decision of the committee on the Revised Standard Version of the Bible to produce a revision of the Apocrypha enhances the importance of having a brief account of these inter-testamental books for Church readers.

With just such a purpose in mind, Professor Robert C. Dentan, of the General Theological Seminary, has written this convenient introduction.

Briefer than most such manuals and more readable than many, *The Apocrypha: Bridge of the Testaments* covers most of the points an ordinary reader would want to know about. The several books themselves are topically arranged. The presumptive background of each book is given with a summary of its contents.

There are chapters on what the Apocrypha is, why it was popular with our fathers and is largely ignored by our contemporaries, what happened between the time the last historical book of the Old Testament was written and the beginning of the New Testament period, and a concluding statement about what the churchman might learn from these "hidden books", as Jerome called them.

The chronological order accepted by Dr. Dentan is the one usually agreed

upon by students of the subject; and the "bridge" character of the position of the Protestant Episcopal Church with regard to the Apocrypha is fully described.

R. O. K.

Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon. Kirchlich-theologisches Handwörterbuch. Edited by Heinz Brunotte and Otto Weber. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Erst Lieferung, 1955, pp. 63 (127 cols.). DM 4.80.

This is the first *Lieferung* of a new dictionary to be completed in approximately thirty-five *Lieferungen* of a hundred and twenty-eight columns each, three volumes. There are to be some sixteen thousand entries dealing with facts, developments, theological problems and concepts in theology and the history and present life of the church.

The price is modest and the quality is high. The articles are prepared by distinguished scholars, mostly German, Scandinavian and Dutch (the articles being in German). Brief bibliographies are provided, together with references to other dictionaries and encyclopedias, periodicals, *Festschriften* and the like.

The work is executed with the greatest skill and care: the classifications are careful, abundant cross references are given, and an index to the whole will be supplied at the end. The articles themselves are necessarily brief because of the great range to be covered in three volumes (the present issue has references to Abraham and to *Action Catholique*!), but they are by no means sketchy. The articles *Abendmahl* and *Alte Kirche* read as samples are precise, highly condensed and very carefully organized, with cross references for all important names and terms appearing in the text. I should call the work a superior, up-to-date cousin of the *HERE*.

H. G.

Psychiatry for Priests, by Herman Dobbelsstein, M.D. Translated from the German by Meyrick Booth, Ph.D. P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1955, pp. 7-143. \$3.00.

Dr. Dobbelsstein is a Roman Catholic German psychiatrist who has written this small book to aid priests in their ministry to people with mental illnesses. The point of departure is from strict Catholic principles and institutional medical psychiatry. Mental illnesses are viewed as entirely the result of a "constitutional disposition" or of organic infection or damage. Difficult questions are kept at a minimum by the approach, and where they do arise, are piously resolved or frankly avoided. The introduction carefully sets out the problems to be discussed. The approach is made clear by a moralistic criticism of Freud.

The main effort of the book is descriptive. The principal types of mental illnesses are described symptomatically in an effort to aid the priest in recognizing them so that steps may be taken to get proper care. The schizophrenic and manic-depressive disorder receive the greatest attention. Their respective types are described, although in the case of schizophrenia, there is some difficulty fitting these to the classification usually used in America. Major symptoms are described and illustrated from Dr. Dobbelsstein's own experience. Finally, some suggestions are made as to how the priest may best deal with psychotic people in his attempts to help them. These suggestions, very good in themselves, often require more skill and understanding than the priest is likely to have or to gain from reading books. In the final pages, there is a chapter on epilepsy, widely divergent in approach from much American psychiatry, and one on the "organic" disorders of paresis, senility, arteriosclerosis, alcohol and drug addiction, and feeble-mindedness. The approach of description

and suggestion is the same, although more brief and, except for alcohol and drug addiction, this includes a medical understanding of the causes of these disorders. The cases of addiction are dealt with briefly, as they do not belong properly to the category and present problems which the book attempts to cover. The final chapter, by far the best in the book, is on the treatment of mental illnesses. It stresses the importance of hospital care and an enlightened understanding of the mental hospital and its treatments to help overcome the suspicion and fear found in most people confronting the problem of mental illness.

This book has some useful information, although a person unfamiliar with mental illness might be more confused than helped by it. The general theme, stressing professional help and hospital care, is much needed but there are other books that do this more competently. Ministers and priests need most help in recognizing incipient illness and Dr. Dobbelsstein does not give it as his material and illustrations cover only openly psychotic cases. Finally, the limits placed on the author by his pre-suppositions keep him from dealing with some of the really difficult problems in the relationship of the Church to psychiatry. The result is that neither his psychiatric or his religious thinking is open and flexible. Dr. Dobbelsstein gives several indications that he might give some valuable insight if he felt more free in his approach. He has not, however, given us much in this book.

J. J. H.

Kerygma und Dogma. Zeitschrift für theologische Forschung und kirchliche Lehre. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, I. Jahrgang, Heft I, 1955, pp. 83. DM 9.80 per year, single copies 3.

Sooner or later a journal with this name was bound to appear! Here it is,

published like the *Lexikon* noted elsewhere by Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in their distinguished manner, on well-chosen paper, accurately set in clear, legible type.

The editorial board is a distinguished group—some of the names perhaps best known in this country are those of Cullmann of Basel, Dahl of Oslo, Regin Prester of Aarhus, von Rad and Schlink of Heidelberg, Skydsgaard of Copenhagen.

The first issue has articles on Wisdom and Folly, by Schlink, Theological Personalism as a Dogmatic Problem, by Gloege, The Augsburg Confession and the Roman Catholic Teaching on the Sacrifice of the Mass, by Prenter, and one on Augustine's Prologue to the *de Doctrina christiana*, by Peter Brunner, concluding with a critical review of Gogarten's *Verhängnis und Hoffnung der Neuzeit*.

A cordial welcome from the ATR!

H. G.

The Development of the Papacy. By H. Burn-Murdoch. London: Faber and Faber, 1954. 432 pp. 42/-

Presumably as a reflection of the current importance of the Papacy in both ecclesiastical and world affairs, there has been a recrudescence in the last few years of historical literature on the subject. To this literature Dr. Burn-Murdoch has made a modest but no less useful contribution. In spite of its general title his book is in effect a source book or anthology of the biblical and historical arguments, documents and events, cited pro and con in the controversies about the Petrine primacy and the Roman claims. Writers on both sides are extensively cited and quoted, so that we have an anthology of the secondary discussion (at least in English) as well as of the source-material. The early centuries are treated in some detail, the Middle Ages selectively, and only a few high spots are touched in modern times. At the end of most

sections the conclusions that might be drawn or summed up, pro and con, with a serious effort at fairness on both sides—though Dr. Burn-Murdoch's own sympathies are revealed in the fact that the arguments always appear A and N, with *negativus* having the last word. It would be possible to comment on some of the instances taken up, but that would tempt the reviewer to rewrite the book, which he has no desire to do; it is a useful handbook, carefully compiled. It certainly seems clear that on the argumentative level the papal claims can neither be decisively refused nor incontrovertibly maintained. The whole Christian world is not likely to become Roman Catholic in a foreseeable future, nor is an institution which has played and still plays so large a part in Christian history likely simply to vanish away. Some contemporary scholars—one thinks of Cullmann, whose work came too late for our author's use, and Dvornik whom he refers to slightly—have been able to say a word that is not merely controversial on this matter. May one hope that affirmation and negation will finally be replaced by understanding, and the final ecumenical encounter be successfully achieved?

E. R. H.

The Book of Daniel By Julius A. Bewer. Harper & Brothers, 1955. pp. 37. \$.75.

The latest addition to the Harper's Annotated Bible is on the same high level of scholarship and practical usefulness as former numbers in this excellent series of commentaries. The introduction is a masterly condensation into less than four pages of the relevant information about the background, original purpose and general significance of Daniel while the notes, though highly compressed, are quite adequate for giving the general reader an intelligent comprehension of the details

of this extremely difficult book. For less than a dollar, there is no better buy on the market! This volume has an additional value as being the last product of Dr. Bewer's long life of devoted biblical scholarship.

R. C. D.

Esther: Song of Songs; Lamentations. By G. A. F. Knight. SCM Press, 1955. pp. 140. /7s. 6d.

Few books of the Old Testament seem superficially to have less direct relationship to the Christian Gospel than the three which are the subject of this new volume in the Torch Bible Commentaries and for that reason a commentary addressed to the ordinary reader is especially welcome and could be very useful. Prof. Knight has done his task valiantly. The only criticism which need to be voiced is that in an effort to bring out the Christian significance of the books the author tends toward a somewhat fanciful Christological interpretation. This is particularly true in dealing with the book of Lamentations where the comparison of the two "sons of God," Israel and Jesus Christ, is carried so far as to verge on the grotesque.

R. C. D.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- A Study of the Language of the Biblical Psalms* (Journal of Biblical Literature Monograph Series, Volume IX). By Matitiah Tsevat. Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 1955. pp. 153. \$1.50.
- Johann Sebastian Bach as Biblical Interpreter.* With an Appendix listing Bach's principal Biblical settings. By William H. Scheide. Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 1952. pp. 40.
- An Humble Supplication to Her Majesty,* by Robert Southwell. Edited by R. C. Bald. Cambridge University Press, 1953. pp. 150, one line block. \$3.00.
- Science and Religion: A Changing Relationship.* The Rede Lecture for 1954. By C. A. Coulson. Cambridge University Press, 1955. pp. 36. \$50.

Christ and the Scientific Road. By Purnell H. Benson. Madison, New Jersey: Religion through Scientific Study, 1954. pp. 26. \$25.

The Office of Women in the Church: a Study in Practical Theology. By Fritz Zerbst, translated by Albert G. Merckens. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955. pp. 128. \$1.00.

The Sensus Plenior of Sacred Scripture. By Raymond Edward Brown. Baltimore: St. Mary's University, 1955. pp. 161. \$2.00.

Sanctorum Communio: Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung über das Symbolgied By Istvan Benko. Basel: Felizian Raugh, 1951. pp. 92.

Interpretatio Mariologica Protoevangelii Posttridentina (usque ad definitionem Immaculatae Conceptionis) Pars prior: *Aetas Aurea Exegesis Catholicae a Concilio Tridentini (1545) usque ad annum 1660.* By Tiburtius Gallus. Rome: Adizioni di Stori e Letteratura, 1953. pp. 287.

Tello and Theotomio, the Twelfth-Century Founders of the Monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra. By E. Austin O'Malley. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1954. pp. 178. \$2.00.

El Problema del Sentido Literal Pleno en la Sagrada Escritura. By Severiano del Paramo. Santander: Universidad Pontificia, 1954. pp. 55.

Concise Dictionary of Ancient History. Edited by P. G. Woodcock. Philosophical Library, 1955. pp. 465. \$6.00.

The Nihilism of John Dewey. By Paul K. Crosser. Philosophical Library, 1955. pp. 238. \$3.75.

Christianity in India. New York: American Church Publications, 2nd ed. 1954. \$2. 47.

1954 *Chicago International Catholic Congress.* (Official Report) New York: American Church Publications, 1954. pp. 100. \$3.75.

One and All: Minneapolis and Evanston. Seabury Press, 1955. pp. 30. \$30

Meditations on the Temptations and Passion of our Lord. By R. E. C. Browne. Morehouse-Gorham, 1955. pp. 44. \$60.

The Taming of the Tongue. By Elaine Murray Stone. West Park, New York: Holy Cross Press, 1954. pp. 48.

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